GHSA-6XCG-RCF7-Q8XW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-15 15:31 – Updated: 2025-09-26 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/core: fix new damon_target objects leaks on damon_commit_targets()
Patch series "mm/damon/core: fix memory leaks and ignored inputs from damon_commit_ctx()".
Due to two bugs in damon_commit_targets() and damon_commit_schemes(), which are called from damon_commit_ctx(), some user inputs can be ignored, and some mmeory objects can be leaked. Fix those.
Note that only DAMON sysfs interface users are affected. Other DAMON core API user modules that more focused more on simple and dedicated production usages, including DAMON_RECLAIM and DAMON_LRU_SORT are not using the buggy function in the way, so not affected.
This patch (of 2):
When new DAMON targets are added via damon_commit_targets(), the newly created targets are not deallocated when updating the internal data (damon_commit_target()) is failed. Worse yet, even if the setup is successfully done, the new target is not linked to the context. Hence, the new targets are always leaked regardless of the internal data setup failure. Fix the leaks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-57886"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-401"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-15T13:15:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/damon/core: fix new damon_target objects leaks on damon_commit_targets()\n\nPatch series \"mm/damon/core: fix memory leaks and ignored inputs from\ndamon_commit_ctx()\".\n\nDue to two bugs in damon_commit_targets() and damon_commit_schemes(),\nwhich are called from damon_commit_ctx(), some user inputs can be ignored,\nand some mmeory objects can be leaked. Fix those.\n\nNote that only DAMON sysfs interface users are affected. Other DAMON core\nAPI user modules that more focused more on simple and dedicated production\nusages, including DAMON_RECLAIM and DAMON_LRU_SORT are not using the buggy\nfunction in the way, so not affected.\n\n\nThis patch (of 2):\n\nWhen new DAMON targets are added via damon_commit_targets(), the newly\ncreated targets are not deallocated when updating the internal data\n(damon_commit_target()) is failed. Worse yet, even if the setup is\nsuccessfully done, the new target is not linked to the context. Hence,\nthe new targets are always leaked regardless of the internal data setup\nfailure. Fix the leaks.",
"id": "GHSA-6xcg-rcf7-q8xw",
"modified": "2025-09-26T21:30:26Z",
"published": "2025-01-15T15:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57886"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3647932d0b3e609c762c55e8f9fe10a09776e0a7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8debfc5b1aa569d3d2ac836af2553da037611c61"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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