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GHSA-6X6C-W9W9-HV4H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 18:14 – Updated: 2026-09-08 18:14
VLAI
Summary
Infracost: Terraform Cloud and registry token disclosure via unvalidated hostname
Details

Impact

Sensitive information exposure in the Infracost Terraform Cloud/Enterprise integration. Several code paths attached a configured secret token to a request whose host was taken straight from the scanned Terraform, with no check that the host was the trusted endpoint.

The condition that matters is whether a Terraform Cloud/Enterprise (or registry) token is present in the run: if one is, the injected hostname can disclose it. Impact therefore depends on the trigger. Under on: pull_request (the only configuration in Infracost's documentation) fork pull requests run without secrets, so no token is present. It only reaches token disclosure under pull_request_target, a same-repository pull request, or another CI setup that provides the token alongside untrusted Terraform, and exploiting an untrusted fork pull request also typically needs a maintainer to approve the workflow run. The patch scopes the token to the trusted host regardless of trigger.

Patches

Fixed in v0.10.45 (#3590) by attaching a token only when the destination host matches the configured trusted host; otherwise Infracost refuses to send it and skips remote variable loading - Installed via the official script, a package manager, or the latest Docker tag: upgrade to v0.10.45 (or later) to receive the fix. - Pinned to a specific version or image digest: bump to v0.10.45.

Workarounds

No full fix without upgrading. To limit exposure: use on: pull_request rather than pull_request_target, pin organization, workspace, and host in Infracost config so the .tf hostname is ignored, and keep Terraform Cloud and registry tokens out of runs that process untrusted pull request content.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/infracost/infracost"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.45"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71494"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T18:14:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-21T18:16:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nSensitive information exposure in the Infracost Terraform Cloud/Enterprise integration. Several code paths attached a configured secret token to a request whose host was taken straight from the scanned Terraform, with no check that the host was the trusted endpoint. \n\nThe condition that matters is whether a Terraform Cloud/Enterprise (or registry) token is present in the run: if one is, the injected hostname can disclose it. Impact therefore depends on the trigger. Under `on: pull_request` (the only configuration in Infracost\u0027s documentation) fork pull requests run without secrets, so no token is present. It only reaches token disclosure under `pull_request_target`, a same-repository pull request, or another CI setup that provides the token alongside untrusted Terraform, and exploiting an untrusted fork pull request also typically needs a maintainer to approve the workflow run. The patch scopes the token to the trusted host regardless of trigger.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `v0.10.45` ([#3590](https://github.com/infracost/infracost/pull/3590)) by attaching a token only when the destination host matches the configured trusted host; otherwise Infracost refuses to send it and skips remote variable loading\n  - Installed via the official script, a package manager, or the `latest` Docker tag: upgrade to `v0.10.45` (or later) to receive the fix.\n  - Pinned to a specific version or image digest: bump to `v0.10.45`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo full fix without upgrading. To limit exposure: use `on: pull_request` rather than `pull_request_target`, pin `organization`, `workspace`, and `host` in Infracost config so the `.tf` hostname is ignored, and keep Terraform Cloud and registry tokens out of runs that process untrusted pull request content.",
  "id": "GHSA-6x6c-w9w9-hv4h",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T18:14:12Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T18:14:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/infracost/infracost/security/advisories/GHSA-6x6c-w9w9-hv4h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71494"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/infracost/infracost/pull/3590"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/infracost/infracost/commit/3d24c757f5e4e60c7259f1b89ad7ceaabcfca86f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/infracost/infracost"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/infracost/infracost/releases/tag/v0.10.45"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Infracost: Terraform Cloud and registry token disclosure via unvalidated hostname"
}



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