GHSA-6WXQ-FJJQ-M2J9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_vhci: Pin module for debugfs file operations

An open debugfs file retains its file_operations pointer in the debugfs proxy state. However, force_suspend_fops, force_wakeup_fops, aosp_capable_fops, and force_devcoredump_fops have no .owner set to THIS_MODULE. As a result, full_proxy_open_regular() calls fops_get() which succeeds without taking a reference to the hci_vhci module.

When userspace opens any of these debugfs files and later closes the /dev/vhci file descriptor (triggering vhci_release() and debugfs file removal), the open debugfs file descriptor remains valid in userspace. Because the module refcount was not incremented, the hci_vhci module can be unloaded via delete_module (rmmod hci_vhci).

When the userspace process subsequently closes the debugfs file descriptor, full_proxy_release() accesses the already unmapped file_operations structure, resulting in a kernel page fault / oops:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff846f18b #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:full_proxy_release+0x8e/0x140 Call Trace: __fput+0x39f/0xa60 fput_close_sync+0xff/0x200 __x64_sys_close+0x8c/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Modules linked in: ... [last unloaded: hci_vhci(E)]

The issue was discovered via manual code audit of drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c and verified on a Linux 7.3-rc6 test VM with CONFIG_BT_VHCI=m by keeping a debugfs file open across controller teardown and module unload.

Set .owner = THIS_MODULE on all four file_operations structures so that debugfs pins the module until all file descriptors are closed.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99481"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:02Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_vhci: Pin module for debugfs file operations\n\nAn open debugfs file retains its file_operations pointer in the\ndebugfs proxy state. However, force_suspend_fops, force_wakeup_fops,\naosp_capable_fops, and force_devcoredump_fops have no .owner set to\nTHIS_MODULE. As a result, full_proxy_open_regular() calls fops_get()\nwhich succeeds without taking a reference to the hci_vhci module.\n\nWhen userspace opens any of these debugfs files and later closes\nthe /dev/vhci file descriptor (triggering vhci_release() and\ndebugfs file removal), the open debugfs file descriptor remains valid\nin userspace. Because the module refcount was not incremented,\nthe hci_vhci module can be unloaded via delete_module (rmmod hci_vhci).\n\nWhen the userspace process subsequently closes the debugfs file\ndescriptor, full_proxy_release() accesses the already unmapped\nfile_operations structure, resulting in a kernel page fault / oops:\n\n  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff846f18b\n  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI\n  RIP: 0010:full_proxy_release+0x8e/0x140\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   __fput+0x39f/0xa60\n   fput_close_sync+0xff/0x200\n   __x64_sys_close+0x8c/0xf0\n   do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x590\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n   \u003c/TASK\u003e\n  Modules linked in: ... [last unloaded: hci_vhci(E)]\n\nThe issue was discovered via manual code audit of\ndrivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c and verified on a Linux 7.3-rc6 test VM\nwith CONFIG_BT_VHCI=m by keeping a debugfs file open across controller\nteardown and module unload.\n\nSet .owner = THIS_MODULE on all four file_operations structures so that\ndebugfs pins the module until all file descriptors are closed.",
  "id": "GHSA-6wxq-fjjq-m2j9",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:26Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99481"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19502449eeeafbf48ad1626cc356d178d549fcc0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/645ee6b176c958579cff1c783413d5cff65c8197"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a82b3dec02bd42eedbc2733b092910f3b6bc4948"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5cc1f1333d47593fcc71b73d1fade556c8ece76"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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