GHSA-6WGM-8C2C-JVC6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-24 15:30 – Updated: 2026-08-04 12:34
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: prevent skb corruption on frag list segmentation

Ian reported several skb corruptions triggered by rx-gro-list, collecting different oops alike:

[ 62.624003] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0 [ 62.631083] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 62.636312] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 62.641541] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 62.644174] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 62.648629] CPU: 1 PID: 913 Comm: napi/eno2-79 Not tainted 6.4.0 #364 [ 62.655162] Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/A2SDi-12C-HLN4F, BIOS 1.7a 10/13/2022 [ 62.663344] RIP: 0010:__udp_gso_segment (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2858 ./include/linux/udp.h:23 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:228 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:261 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:277) [ 62.687193] RSP: 0018:ffffbd3a83b4f868 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 62.692515] RAX: 00000000000000ce RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 62.699743] RDX: ffffa124def8a000 RSI: 0000000000000079 RDI: ffffa125952a14d4 [ 62.706970] RBP: ffffa124def8a000 R08: 0000000000000022 R09: 00002000001558c9 [ 62.714199] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000be554639 R12: 00000000000000e2 [ 62.721426] R13: ffffa125952a1400 R14: ffffa125952a1400 R15: 00002000001558c9 [ 62.728654] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa127efa40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 62.736852] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 62.742702] CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 00000001034b0000 CR4: 00000000003526e0 [ 62.749948] Call Trace: [ 62.752498] [ 62.779267] inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1398) [ 62.787605] skb_mac_gso_segment (net/core/gro.c:141) [ 62.791906] __skb_gso_segment (net/core/dev.c:3403 (discriminator 2)) [ 62.800492] validate_xmit_skb (./include/linux/netdevice.h:4862 net/core/dev.c:3659) [ 62.804695] validate_xmit_skb_list (net/core/dev.c:3710) [ 62.809158] sch_direct_xmit (net/sched/sch_generic.c:330) [ 62.813198] __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3805 net/core/dev.c:4210) net/netfilter/core.c:626) [ 62.821093] br_dev_queue_push_xmit (net/bridge/br_forward.c:55) [ 62.825652] maybe_deliver (net/bridge/br_forward.c:193) [ 62.829420] br_flood (net/bridge/br_forward.c:233) [ 62.832758] br_handle_frame_finish (net/bridge/br_input.c:215) [ 62.837403] br_handle_frame (net/bridge/br_input.c:298 net/bridge/br_input.c:416) [ 62.851417] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:5387) [ 62.866114] __netif_receive_skb_list_core (net/core/dev.c:5570) [ 62.871367] netif_receive_skb_list_internal (net/core/dev.c:5638 net/core/dev.c:5727) [ 62.876795] napi_complete_done (./include/linux/list.h:37 ./include/net/gro.h:434 ./include/net/gro.h:429 net/core/dev.c:6067) [ 62.881004] ixgbe_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:3191) [ 62.893534] __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6498) [ 62.897133] napi_threaded_poll (./include/linux/netpoll.h:89 net/core/dev.c:6640) [ 62.905276] kthread (kernel/kthread.c:379) [ 62.913435] ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:314) [ 62.917119]

In the critical scenario, rx-gro-list GRO-ed packets are fed, via a bridge, both to the local input path and to an egress device (tun).

The segmentation of such packets unsafely writes to the cloned skbs with shared heads.

This change addresses the issue by uncloning as needed the to-be-segmented skbs.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-54094"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-24T13:16:11Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: prevent skb corruption on frag list segmentation\n\nIan reported several skb corruptions triggered by rx-gro-list,\ncollecting different oops alike:\n\n[   62.624003] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0\n[   62.631083] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n[   62.636312] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n[   62.641541] PGD 0 P4D 0\n[   62.644174] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI\n[   62.648629] CPU: 1 PID: 913 Comm: napi/eno2-79 Not tainted 6.4.0 #364\n[   62.655162] Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/A2SDi-12C-HLN4F, BIOS 1.7a 10/13/2022\n[   62.663344] RIP: 0010:__udp_gso_segment (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2858\n./include/linux/udp.h:23 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:228 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:261\nnet/ipv4/udp_offload.c:277)\n[   62.687193] RSP: 0018:ffffbd3a83b4f868 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[   62.692515] RAX: 00000000000000ce RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[   62.699743] RDX: ffffa124def8a000 RSI: 0000000000000079 RDI: ffffa125952a14d4\n[   62.706970] RBP: ffffa124def8a000 R08: 0000000000000022 R09: 00002000001558c9\n[   62.714199] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000be554639 R12: 00000000000000e2\n[   62.721426] R13: ffffa125952a1400 R14: ffffa125952a1400 R15: 00002000001558c9\n[   62.728654] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa127efa40000(0000)\nknlGS:0000000000000000\n[   62.736852] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[   62.742702] CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 00000001034b0000 CR4: 00000000003526e0\n[   62.749948] Call Trace:\n[   62.752498]  \u003cTASK\u003e\n[   62.779267] inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1398)\n[   62.787605] skb_mac_gso_segment (net/core/gro.c:141)\n[   62.791906] __skb_gso_segment (net/core/dev.c:3403 (discriminator 2))\n[   62.800492] validate_xmit_skb (./include/linux/netdevice.h:4862\nnet/core/dev.c:3659)\n[   62.804695] validate_xmit_skb_list (net/core/dev.c:3710)\n[   62.809158] sch_direct_xmit (net/sched/sch_generic.c:330)\n[   62.813198] __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3805 net/core/dev.c:4210)\nnet/netfilter/core.c:626)\n[   62.821093] br_dev_queue_push_xmit (net/bridge/br_forward.c:55)\n[   62.825652] maybe_deliver (net/bridge/br_forward.c:193)\n[   62.829420] br_flood (net/bridge/br_forward.c:233)\n[   62.832758] br_handle_frame_finish (net/bridge/br_input.c:215)\n[   62.837403] br_handle_frame (net/bridge/br_input.c:298\nnet/bridge/br_input.c:416)\n[   62.851417] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:5387)\n[   62.866114] __netif_receive_skb_list_core (net/core/dev.c:5570)\n[   62.871367] netif_receive_skb_list_internal (net/core/dev.c:5638\nnet/core/dev.c:5727)\n[   62.876795] napi_complete_done (./include/linux/list.h:37\n./include/net/gro.h:434 ./include/net/gro.h:429 net/core/dev.c:6067)\n[   62.881004] ixgbe_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:3191)\n[   62.893534] __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6498)\n[   62.897133] napi_threaded_poll (./include/linux/netpoll.h:89\nnet/core/dev.c:6640)\n[   62.905276] kthread (kernel/kthread.c:379)\n[   62.913435] ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:314)\n[   62.917119]  \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nIn the critical scenario, rx-gro-list GRO-ed packets are fed, via a\nbridge, both to the local input path and to an egress device (tun).\n\nThe segmentation of such packets unsafely writes to the cloned skbs\nwith shared heads.\n\nThis change addresses the issue by uncloning as needed the\nto-be-segmented skbs.",
  "id": "GHSA-6wgm-8c2c-jvc6",
  "modified": "2026-08-04T12:34:44Z",
  "published": "2025-12-24T15:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-54094"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1731234e8b60063eae858c77b55c7a88f5084353"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a59f29961cf97b98b02acaadf5a0b1f8dde938c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc3ab5d2ab69823f5cff89cf74ef78ffa0386c9a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c329b261afe71197d9da83c1f18eb45a7e97e089"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea438eed94ac0fe69b93ac034738823c0e989a12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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