GHSA-6W4Q-23CF-J9JP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-21 18:32 – Updated: 2022-09-21 18:32Impact
A foreign user can write to the session object of another user if the session object ID is known. For example, a foreign user can assign the session object to their own user by writing to the user field and then read any custom fields of that session object.
Note that assigning a session to a foreign user does not usually change the privileges of neither of the two users, according to how Parse Server uses session objects internally. However, if custom logic is used to relate specific session objects to privileges this vulnerability may have a higher level of severity.
The vulnerability does not allow a foreign user to assign a session object to themselves, read the session token, and then reassign the session object to the original user to then authenticate as that user with the known session token. The vulnerability only exists for foreign session objects, a user cannot assign their own session to another user.
While it is unlikely that the session object ID of another user is known, it is possible to brute-force guess an object ID, even though the attacker would not know to which user a successfully guessed session object ID belongs.
Patches
The fix prevents writing to foreign session objects, even if the session object ID is known.
Workarounds
Add a beforeSave trigger to the _Session class and prevent writing if the requesting user is different from the user in the session object.
References
- GitHub advisory GHSA-6w4q-23cf-j9jp
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.10.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-39225"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-276",
"CWE-669"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-21T18:32:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-23T07:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA foreign user can write to the session object of another user if the session object ID is known. For example, a foreign user can assign the session object to their own user by writing to the `user` field and then read any custom fields of that session object.\n\nNote that assigning a session to a foreign user does not usually change the privileges of neither of the two users, according to how Parse Server uses session objects internally. However, if custom logic is used to relate specific session objects to privileges this vulnerability may have a higher level of severity.\n\nThe vulnerability does not allow a foreign user to assign a session object to themselves, read the session token, and then reassign the session object to the original user to then authenticate as that user with the known session token. The vulnerability only exists for foreign session objects, a user cannot assign their own session to another user.\n\nWhile it is unlikely that the session object ID of another user is known, it is possible to brute-force guess an object ID, even though the attacker would not know to which user a successfully guessed session object ID belongs.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix prevents writing to foreign session objects, even if the session object ID is known.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAdd a `beforeSave` trigger to the `_Session` class and prevent writing if the requesting user is different from the user in the session object.\n\n### References\n\n- GitHub advisory [GHSA-6w4q-23cf-j9jp](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-6w4q-23cf-j9jp)",
"id": "GHSA-6w4q-23cf-j9jp",
"modified": "2022-09-21T18:32:01Z",
"published": "2022-09-21T18:32:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-6w4q-23cf-j9jp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39225"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/37fed3062ccc3ef1dfd49a9fc53318e72b3e4aff"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/4.10.15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/5.2.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "parse-server\u0027s session object properties can be updated by foreign user if object ID is known"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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