GHSA-6V8J-33HC-MV84
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:42 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:42Description
The ux_icon() Twig function is marked is_safe=['html'], so Twig never escapes its output. Icon::toHtml() inlines the SVG source verbatim into the page. Browsers execute <script> elements and on* event-handler attributes found inside inline SVG, making any unsanitized icon a vector for cross-site scripting.
Two code paths were affected. In the local file path, Icon::fromFile() only stripped <script> elements that were direct children of <svg>, leaving nested scripts and all on* attributes untouched despite a code comment claiming broader protection. In the Iconify on-demand path (enabled by default), the remote JSON body field was wrapped into an Icon object with no sanitization at all. Concrete attack vectors include a malicious SVG icon pack from a third-party theme or downloaded icon set, or a controlled Iconify endpoint configured via iconify.endpoint (including a poisoned cache).
Resolution
Introducing an IconFactory that centralizes sanitization across every icon source before an Icon object is created. The sanitizer removes script-capable elements (script, foreignObject, iframe, object, embed), SMIL animations targeting on*, href, or xlink:href attributes, CDATA sections, processing instructions, all on* attributes, and javascript:, vbscript:, and data:text/html URL schemes.
<style> elements are kept for theming but have any handlers stripped. Icons that contain none of these constructs are byte-for-byte identical after sanitization.
Credits
Symfony would like to thank Pascal Cescon for reporting the issue and Hugo Alliaume for providing the fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/ux-icons"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.17.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.36.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/ux-icons"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55877"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:42:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Description\n\nThe `ux_icon()` Twig function is marked `is_safe=[\u0027html\u0027]`, so Twig never escapes its output. `Icon::toHtml()` inlines the SVG source verbatim into the page. Browsers execute `\u003cscript\u003e` elements and `on*` event-handler attributes found inside inline SVG, making any unsanitized icon a vector for cross-site scripting.\n\nTwo code paths were affected. In the local file path, `Icon::fromFile()` only stripped `\u003cscript\u003e` elements that were direct children of `\u003csvg\u003e`, leaving nested scripts and all `on*` attributes untouched despite a code comment claiming broader protection. In the Iconify on-demand path (enabled by default), the remote JSON `body` field was wrapped into an `Icon` object with no sanitization at all. Concrete attack vectors include a malicious SVG icon pack from a third-party theme or downloaded icon set, or a controlled Iconify endpoint configured via `iconify.endpoint` (including a poisoned cache).\n\n### Resolution\n\nIntroducing an `IconFactory` that centralizes sanitization across every icon source before an `Icon` object is created. The sanitizer removes script-capable elements (`script`, `foreignObject`, `iframe`, `object`, `embed`), SMIL animations targeting `on*`, `href`, or `xlink:href` attributes, CDATA sections, processing instructions, all `on*` attributes, and `javascript:`, `vbscript:`, and `data:text/html` URL schemes. \n`\u003cstyle\u003e` elements are kept for theming but have any handlers stripped. Icons that contain none of these constructs are byte-for-byte identical after sanitization. \n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Pascal Cescon for reporting the issue and Hugo Alliaume for providing the fix.",
"id": "GHSA-6v8j-33hc-mv84",
"modified": "2026-06-19T21:42:15Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T21:42:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/ux/security/advisories/GHSA-6v8j-33hc-mv84"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/ux-icons/CVE-2026-55877.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/ux"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "symfony/ux-icons: XSS via unsanitized SVG content in local files and Iconify on-demand responses"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.