GHSA-6QVG-P925-PXR9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-16 15:30 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: fix memory leak in smb3_fs_context_parse_param error path
Add proper cleanup of ctx->source and fc->source to the cifs_parse_mount_err error handler. This ensures that memory allocated for the source strings is correctly freed on all error paths, matching the cleanup already performed in the success path by smb3_cleanup_fs_context_contents(). Pointers are also set to NULL after freeing to prevent potential double-free issues.
This change fixes a memory leak originally detected by syzbot. The leak occurred when processing Opt_source mount options if an error happened after ctx->source and fc->source were successfully allocated but before the function completed.
The specific leak sequence was: 1. ctx->source = smb3_fs_context_fullpath(ctx, '/') allocates memory 2. fc->source = kstrdup(ctx->source, GFP_KERNEL) allocates more memory 3. A subsequent error jumps to cifs_parse_mount_err 4. The old error handler freed passwords but not the source strings, causing the memory to leak.
This issue was not addressed by commit e8c73eb7db0a ("cifs: client: fix memory leak in smb3_fs_context_parse_param"), which only fixed leaks from repeated fsconfig() calls but not this error path.
Patch updated with minor change suggested by kernel test robot
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68219"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-16T14:15:55Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncifs: fix memory leak in smb3_fs_context_parse_param error path\n\nAdd proper cleanup of ctx-\u003esource and fc-\u003esource to the\ncifs_parse_mount_err error handler. This ensures that memory allocated\nfor the source strings is correctly freed on all error paths, matching\nthe cleanup already performed in the success path by\nsmb3_cleanup_fs_context_contents().\nPointers are also set to NULL after freeing to prevent potential\ndouble-free issues.\n\nThis change fixes a memory leak originally detected by syzbot. The\nleak occurred when processing Opt_source mount options if an error\nhappened after ctx-\u003esource and fc-\u003esource were successfully\nallocated but before the function completed.\n\nThe specific leak sequence was:\n1. ctx-\u003esource = smb3_fs_context_fullpath(ctx, \u0027/\u0027) allocates memory\n2. fc-\u003esource = kstrdup(ctx-\u003esource, GFP_KERNEL) allocates more memory\n3. A subsequent error jumps to cifs_parse_mount_err\n4. The old error handler freed passwords but not the source strings,\ncausing the memory to leak.\n\nThis issue was not addressed by commit e8c73eb7db0a (\"cifs: client:\nfix memory leak in smb3_fs_context_parse_param\"), which only fixed\nleaks from repeated fsconfig() calls but not this error path.\n\nPatch updated with minor change suggested by kernel test robot",
"id": "GHSA-6qvg-p925-pxr9",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:19Z",
"published": "2025-12-16T15:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37010021d7e0341bb241ca00bcbae31f2c50b23f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/48d69290270891f988e72edddd9688c20515421d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7627864dc3121f39e220f5253a227edf472de59e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e4d9120cfa413dd34f4f434befc5dbe6c38b2e5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8071fd69df335362be5ecf5df5a167fd1eb5853"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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