GHSA-6QH9-H6WF-JGQC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 21:11 – Updated: 2026-05-27 21:11Description
Symfony\Component\Cache\Adapter\PdoAdapter is the PDO-backed cache adapter. Its clear($prefix) method (inherited from AbstractAdapterTrait) is documented to delete cache items whose key starts with $prefix.
In the non-versioning code path, the caller-supplied $prefix is concatenated into $namespace = $this->namespace.$prefix and passed to PdoAdapter::doClear(), which builds:
DELETE FROM <table> WHERE <id_col> LIKE '<namespace>%'
The value is interpolated directly into the SQL text and executed with PDO::exec(): $namespace is not bound. A caller able to influence $prefix can break out of the literal and inject SQL, expanding deletion scope from the intended prefix to arbitrary rows, or otherwise reshape query semantics.
Most applications don't expose clear($prefix) to untrusted input directly, but the contract of the method is to safely accept any prefix string, so the lack of escaping is a defect of the adapter itself.
Resolution
AbstractAdapterTrait::clear() now rejects any $prefix containing characters outside [-+.A-Za-z0-9]: when an invalid prefix is supplied, the method logs a warning and returns false instead of reaching the SQL layer. This blocks quotes, %, null bytes and other characters that would let an attacker break out of the LIKE literal.
The patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.
Credits
Symfony would like to thank secsys_codex for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for fixing it.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/cache"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.4.52"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/cache"
},
"ranges": [
{
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{
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},
{
"fixed": "6.4.40"
}
],
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}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/cache"
},
"ranges": [
{
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{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
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{
"fixed": "7.4.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/cache"
},
"ranges": [
{
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"introduced": "8.0.0"
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{
"fixed": "8.0.12"
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}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
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{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
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"ranges": [
{
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{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
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{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
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{
"package": {
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"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
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{
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},
{
"fixed": "8.0.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45073"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T21:11:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Cache\\Adapter\\PdoAdapter` is the PDO-backed cache adapter. Its `clear($prefix)` method (inherited from `AbstractAdapterTrait`) is documented to delete cache items whose key starts with `$prefix`.\n\nIn the non-versioning code path, the caller-supplied `$prefix` is concatenated into `$namespace = $this-\u003enamespace.$prefix` and passed to `PdoAdapter::doClear()`, which builds:\n\n```sql\nDELETE FROM \u003ctable\u003e WHERE \u003cid_col\u003e LIKE \u0027\u003cnamespace\u003e%\u0027\n```\n\nThe value is interpolated directly into the SQL text and executed with `PDO::exec()`: `$namespace` is not bound. A caller able to influence `$prefix` can break out of the literal and inject SQL, expanding deletion scope from the intended prefix to arbitrary rows, or otherwise reshape query semantics.\n\nMost applications don\u0027t expose `clear($prefix)` to untrusted input directly, but the contract of the method is to safely accept any prefix string, so the lack of escaping is a defect of the adapter itself.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`AbstractAdapterTrait::clear()` now rejects any `$prefix` containing characters outside `[-+.A-Za-z0-9]`: when an invalid prefix is supplied, the method logs a warning and returns `false` instead of reaching the SQL layer. This blocks quotes, `%`, null bytes and other characters that would let an attacker break out of the `LIKE` literal.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/ec50b799d79ebe24561f29351c1efcb6da95c9b1) for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\nSymfony would like to thank secsys_codex for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for fixing it.",
"id": "GHSA-6qh9-h6wf-jgqc",
"modified": "2026-05-27T21:11:22Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T21:11:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/security/advisories/GHSA-6qh9-h6wf-jgqc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/ec50b799d79ebe24561f29351c1efcb6da95c9b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/cache/CVE-2026-45073.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/symfony/CVE-2026-45073.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://symfony.com/cve-2026-45073"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Symfony Vulnerable to SQL Injection in PdoAdapter::doClear() via Unsanitized $prefix"
}
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