GHSA-6Q49-R2PP-PJWC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: avoid teardown retry loop on xarray allocation failure
__ublk_shmem_remove_ranges() removes matching maple tree ranges in batches, but first stores each range into a temporary xarray so that the pages can be unpinned after dropping the maple tree lock.
That temporary xarray is filled under the maple tree lock with xa_store(..., GFP_ATOMIC). If the store fails before mas_erase(), the current range is left in the tree and the helper returns false. The outer ublk_shmem_remove_ranges() loop then immediately retries the same range. While the atomic allocation keeps failing, the teardown path has no forward progress.
The issue can be reproduced with radix_tree_node failslab injection after a SHMEM_ZC buffer has already been registered:
# Kernel config: # CONFIG_BLK_DEV_UBLK=y # CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y # CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION=y # CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS=y # CONFIG_FAILSLAB=y
echo 10 > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages mkdir -p /tmp/htlb mount -t hugetlbfs none /tmp/htlb fallocate -l 4M /tmp/htlb/ublk_buf
dev_id=$(kublk add -t null --shmem_zc \ --htlb /tmp/htlb/ublk_buf | awk -F '[ :]' '/dev id/ {print $3}')
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/slab/radix_tree_node/failslab echo Y > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/cache-filter echo Y > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/ignore-gfp-wait echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/interval echo -1 > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/times echo 100 > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/probability
kublk del -n "$dev_id"
On the unfixed kernel the delete command was still running after 3 seconds. Disabling failslab made it return. The fault-injection stack showed:
should_failslab kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof __xas_nomem __xa_store xa_store __ublk_shmem_remove_ranges ublk_cdev_rel ublk_ctrl_del_dev
Remove the allocation from the teardown loop. Keep the existing batch limit, but collect {base_pfn, nr_pages} pairs in a fixed-size stack array. Once a matching range is found, the range is erased from the maple tree before dropping the lock, so each successful scan makes progress without depending on any GFP_ATOMIC allocation.
With the same failslab settings, the fixed kernel completed "kublk del -n $dev_id" successfully in about 45 ms.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90181"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:12Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nublk: avoid teardown retry loop on xarray allocation failure\n\n__ublk_shmem_remove_ranges() removes matching maple tree ranges in\nbatches, but first stores each range into a temporary xarray so that the\npages can be unpinned after dropping the maple tree lock.\n\nThat temporary xarray is filled under the maple tree lock with\nxa_store(..., GFP_ATOMIC). If the store fails before mas_erase(), the\ncurrent range is left in the tree and the helper returns false. The\nouter ublk_shmem_remove_ranges() loop then immediately retries the same\nrange. While the atomic allocation keeps failing, the teardown path has\nno forward progress.\n\nThe issue can be reproduced with radix_tree_node failslab injection after\na SHMEM_ZC buffer has already been registered:\n\n # Kernel config:\n # CONFIG_BLK_DEV_UBLK=y\n # CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y\n # CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION=y\n # CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS=y\n # CONFIG_FAILSLAB=y\n\n echo 10 \u003e /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages\n mkdir -p /tmp/htlb\n mount -t hugetlbfs none /tmp/htlb\n fallocate -l 4M /tmp/htlb/ublk_buf\n\n dev_id=$(kublk add -t null --shmem_zc \\\n\t\t--htlb /tmp/htlb/ublk_buf |\n\t awk -F \u0027[ :]\u0027 \u0027/dev id/ {print $3}\u0027)\n\n echo 1 \u003e /sys/kernel/slab/radix_tree_node/failslab\n echo Y \u003e /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/cache-filter\n echo Y \u003e /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/ignore-gfp-wait\n echo 1 \u003e /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/interval\n echo -1 \u003e /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/times\n echo 100 \u003e /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/probability\n\n kublk del -n \"$dev_id\"\n\nOn the unfixed kernel the delete command was still running after 3\nseconds. Disabling failslab made it return. The fault-injection stack\nshowed:\n\n should_failslab\n kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof\n __xas_nomem\n __xa_store\n xa_store\n __ublk_shmem_remove_ranges\n ublk_cdev_rel\n ublk_ctrl_del_dev\n\nRemove the allocation from the teardown loop. Keep the existing batch\nlimit, but collect {base_pfn, nr_pages} pairs in a fixed-size stack array.\nOnce a matching range is found, the range is erased from the maple tree\nbefore dropping the lock, so each successful scan makes progress without\ndepending on any GFP_ATOMIC allocation.\n\nWith the same failslab settings, the fixed kernel completed\n\"kublk del -n $dev_id\" successfully in about 45 ms.",
"id": "GHSA-6q49-r2pp-pjwc",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90181"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4fd66a7f829f3f38f92a79081f0f2688aed644f0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9cc6cc74daf6fef533dbe65d8cee779fea69600"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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