GHSA-6Q43-GP6V-HQMF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: lg-g15: cancel pending work on remove to fix a use-after-free
lg_g15_data is allocated with devm and holds a work item. The report handlers schedule that work straight from device input. lg_g15_event() and lg_g15_v2_event() do it on the backlight cycle key, and lg_g510_leds_event() does it too. The worker dereferences the lg_g15_data back through container_of.
The driver had no remove callback and never cancelled the work. So if a report scheduled the work and the keyboard was then unplugged, devres freed lg_g15_data while the work was still pending or running, and the worker touched freed memory. This is a use-after-free. It is reachable as a race on device unplug.
Add a remove callback that cancels the work before devres frees the state. g15->work is only initialized for the models that schedule it (G15, G15 v2, G510). The G13 and Z-10 leave it zeroed, so guard the cancel on g15->work.func to avoid cancelling a work that was never set up. The g15 NULL test mirrors the one already in lg_g15_raw_event().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64362"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: lg-g15: cancel pending work on remove to fix a use-after-free\n\nlg_g15_data is allocated with devm and holds a work item. The report\nhandlers schedule that work straight from device input.\nlg_g15_event() and lg_g15_v2_event() do it on the backlight cycle key,\nand lg_g510_leds_event() does it too. The worker dereferences the\nlg_g15_data back through container_of.\n\nThe driver had no remove callback and never cancelled the work. So if a\nreport scheduled the work and the keyboard was then unplugged, devres\nfreed lg_g15_data while the work was still pending or running, and the\nworker touched freed memory. This is a use-after-free. It is reachable\nas a race on device unplug.\n\nAdd a remove callback that cancels the work before devres frees the\nstate. g15-\u003ework is only initialized for the models that schedule it\n(G15, G15 v2, G510). The G13 and Z-10 leave it zeroed, so guard the\ncancel on g15-\u003ework.func to avoid cancelling a work that was never set\nup. The g15 NULL test mirrors the one already in lg_g15_raw_event().",
"id": "GHSA-6q43-gp6v-hqmf",
"modified": "2026-09-04T18:31:12Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64362"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33cd1a000daf929356aacf2b191d31714ff0615e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b9a3919aac6977262f04d5365c0456877522a44"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4aef9676c26dff8723b56834951cfc6b618f0986"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d0d51bc12d246accbfbb94de05d729c68c9b8fb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7705b4140d188ce22656f6e541ae7ef834c7e11a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8131f4226688c4be5f30874d167e44dab838eb09"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/acce9dee807f21184fff19ad17c8ed464247e7f7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dfc6e61f83113cc18346b6988f07271c0063357d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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