GHSA-6M96-2PHX-3668

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-16 12:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

udf: fix return value for non-recorded-allocated extents in udf_map_block()

When someone creates a corrupted UDF filesystem where symlink contains other extent type than EXT_RECORDED_ALLOCATED, it can leads to a crash like:

Oops: general protection fault KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access RIP: 0010:page_get_link (fs/namei.c:6503) Call Trace: vfs_readlink (fs/namei.c:6419) do_readlinkat (fs/stat.c:583) __x64_sys_readlink (fs/stat.c:605 fs/stat.c:602 fs/stat.c:602)

This is because in this case udf_map_block() fails to convert return value of inode_bmap() from 1 to 0. Returned '1' propagates through udf_bread() all the way up to __page_get_link() where it ends up being treated as a folio pointer with obvious results.

Move the reset to 0 line outside the if, so udf_map_block() returns either 0 or -errno, even if the extent type is not EXT_RECORDED_ALLOCATED.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99311"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T10:17:06Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nudf: fix return value for non-recorded-allocated extents in udf_map_block()\n\nWhen someone creates a corrupted UDF filesystem where symlink contains\nother extent type than EXT_RECORDED_ALLOCATED, it can leads to a crash\nlike:\n\n Oops: general protection fault\n KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access\n RIP: 0010:page_get_link (fs/namei.c:6503)\n Call Trace:\n  vfs_readlink (fs/namei.c:6419)\n  do_readlinkat (fs/stat.c:583)\n  __x64_sys_readlink (fs/stat.c:605 fs/stat.c:602 fs/stat.c:602)\n\nThis is because in this case udf_map_block() fails to convert return\nvalue of inode_bmap() from 1 to 0. Returned \u00271\u0027 propagates through\nudf_bread() all the way up to __page_get_link() where it ends up being\ntreated as a folio pointer with obvious results.\n\nMove the reset to 0 line outside the if, so udf_map_block() returns either\n0 or -errno, even if the extent type is not EXT_RECORDED_ALLOCATED.",
  "id": "GHSA-6m96-2phx-3668",
  "modified": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
  "published": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99311"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d7f6c2b3c07fa239ebc169280eba9932cc56f46"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f242ca0878896df30292f4922700a32e8fdd039"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df713b82b4b9671c16b52b60f3412c677719e2b8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f022984a4a1c18aa9c506790eb47da000dce95a7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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