Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-6JX2-QMXH-94V4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-15 12:30

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Invalidate RCU pointers after final spin unlock

In a sleepable BPF program, a spin lock can provide the only RCU protection for a kptr. The final bpf_spin_unlock() ends that protection, but the verifier leaves the pointer valid. Another CPU can then free the object before the pointer is used. A capability-limited runtime PoC triggered a task_struct use-after-free in __bpf_get_task_stack().

Record whether the program is in an RCU-protected context before releasing the lock. Invalidate RCU-protected pointers only when the unlock leaves the final such context. This preserves valid pointers in non-sleepable programs and inside an explicit RCU read-side section.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-90317"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Invalidate RCU pointers after final spin unlock\n\nIn a sleepable BPF program, a spin lock can provide the only RCU protection\nfor a kptr. The final bpf_spin_unlock() ends that protection, but the\nverifier leaves the pointer valid. Another CPU can then free the object\nbefore the pointer is used. A capability-limited runtime PoC triggered a\ntask_struct use-after-free in __bpf_get_task_stack().\n\nRecord whether the program is in an RCU-protected context before releasing\nthe lock. Invalidate RCU-protected pointers only when the unlock leaves the\nfinal such context. This preserves valid pointers in non-sleepable programs\nand inside an explicit RCU read-side section.",
  "id": "GHSA-6jx2-qmxh-94v4",
  "modified": "2026-10-15T12:30:50Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T18:32:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90317"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/180c7000712db77063b3a26f4c97e7dd9038f449"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ae71629357d0a6d0bdadb929c7b296d5b7e61c2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f81972b235f3ebfa40bdce8bcfee3f242fb24065"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-90317 (GCVE-0-2026-90317)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-17 16:08 – Updated: 2026-10-19 09:01

Title

bpf: Invalidate RCU pointers after final spin unlock

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Invalidate RCU pointers after final spin unlock In a sleepable BPF program, a spin lock can provide the only RCU protection for a kptr. The final bpf_spin_unlock() ends that protection, but the verifier leaves the pointer valid. Another CPU can then free the object before the pointer is used. A capability-limited runtime PoC triggered a task_struct use-after-free in __bpf_get_task_stack(). Record whether the program is in an RCU-protected context before releasing the lock. Invalidate RCU-protected pointers only when the unlock leaves the final such context. This preserves valid pointers in non-sleepable programs and inside an explicit RCU read-side section.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Assigner

Linux CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard D 53/100 over 6639 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f81972b235f3ebfa4…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ae71629357d0a6d0…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/180c7000712db7706…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: 5861d1e8dbc4e1a03ebffb96ac041026cdd34c07 , < f81972b235f3ebfa40bdce8bcfee3f242fb24065 (git) Affected: 5861d1e8dbc4e1a03ebffb96ac041026cdd34c07 , < 7ae71629357d0a6d0bdadb929c7b296d5b7e61c2 (git) Affected: 5861d1e8dbc4e1a03ebffb96ac041026cdd34c07 , < 180c7000712db77063b3a26f4c97e7dd9038f449 (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 6.6 Unaffected: 0 , < 6.6 (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.57 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.6 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "f81972b235f3ebfa40bdce8bcfee3f242fb24065",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5861d1e8dbc4e1a03ebffb96ac041026cdd34c07",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7ae71629357d0a6d0bdadb929c7b296d5b7e61c2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5861d1e8dbc4e1a03ebffb96ac041026cdd34c07",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "180c7000712db77063b3a26f4c97e7dd9038f449",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5861d1e8dbc4e1a03ebffb96ac041026cdd34c07",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.6"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.6",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.57",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.57",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.6",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.6",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.6",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.6",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Invalidate RCU pointers after final spin unlock\n\nIn a sleepable BPF program, a spin lock can provide the only RCU protection\nfor a kptr. The final bpf_spin_unlock() ends that protection, but the\nverifier leaves the pointer valid. Another CPU can then free the object\nbefore the pointer is used. A capability-limited runtime PoC triggered a\ntask_struct use-after-free in __bpf_get_task_stack().\n\nRecord whether the program is in an RCU-protected context before releasing\nthe lock. Invalidate RCU-protected pointers only when the unlock leaves the\nfinal such context. This preserves valid pointers in non-sleepable programs\nand inside an explicit RCU read-side section."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The attacker-controlled input is a sleepable BPF program loaded via bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD) whose bytecode reaches process_spin_lock() in kernel/bpf/verifier.c, takes bpf_spin_lock, LDXes a map kptr, then bpf_spin_unlock. That program image arrives through the local bpf() syscall, not a network protocol message.\nAC:L - The attacker drives both sides: a sleepable fentry.s or BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL program loads a task kptr under bpf_spin_lock, unlocks, then uses it, while another thread bpf_kptr_xchg\u0027s the same slot to NULL so bpf_task_release_dtor/put_task_struct_rcu_user can call_rcu it. After unlock, preempt/IRQs are re-enabled so the grace period can finish; a PoC hit the UAF.\nPR:L - A sleepable BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL program is sufficient: bpf_prog_load() requires only bpf_token_capable(CAP_BPF) because is_perfmon_prog_type() is false for SYSCALL, and map_check_btf() needs CAP_BPF for BPF_SPIN_LOCK|BPF_KPTR fields. CAP_BPF is delegable via BPF tokens into a user namespace; the report used a capability-limited PoC, not init-namespace root.\nUI:N - The attacker loads the sleepable program, creates the lock+kptr ARRAY map, stores a task with bpf_task_from_pid/bpf_kptr_xchg, and runs it via bpf(BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN) (bpf_prog_test_run_syscall) or by calling getpgid after attaching fentry.s; no victim mount or file open is required.\nS:U - The use-after-free is of a host kernel task_struct consumed by bpf_task_acquire and __bpf_get_task_stack in the same kernel that accepted the program. That is local privilege escalation inside one kernel authority, not a VM, IOMMU, or guest-to-host crossing.\nC:H - After the final bpf_spin_unlock, process_spin_lock() leaves the map-loaded task kptr as MEM_RCU, so the program can LDX task_struct fields or call bpf_task_acquire (refcount_inc_not_zero on rcu_users) and __bpf_get_task_stack (try_get_task_stack/task_pt_regs) on a call_rcu-freed object. Spraying that slot yields an arbitrary kernel read.\nI:H - The same stale MEM_RCU task_struct pointer can be passed to bpf_task_acquire after bpf_task_release_dtor has dropped rcu_users and delayed_put_task_struct has freed it; a sprayed replacement becomes an owned kptr the attacker can feed to other kfuncs or store back with bpf_kptr_xchg, giving a write and control-flow primitive.\nA:H - Using the dangling task pointer in __bpf_get_task_stack (try_get_task_stack/task_pt_regs) or bpf_task_acquire after put_task_struct_rcu_user\u0027s call_rcu has run oopses or panics the kernel even without a full exploit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T09:01:33.647Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f81972b235f3ebfa40bdce8bcfee3f242fb24065"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ae71629357d0a6d0bdadb929c7b296d5b7e61c2"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/180c7000712db77063b3a26f4c97e7dd9038f449"
        }
      ],
      "title": "bpf: Invalidate RCU pointers after final spin unlock",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-90317",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-17T16:08:35.537Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.801Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T09:01:33.647Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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