GHSA-6J2G-QW4H-45F7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/uverbs: Fix DMABUF use-after-free during ufile cleanup

The DMABUF release can race with ufile cleanup. When the cleanup holds hw_destroy_rwsem for write, uverbs_uobject_release() fails its trylock and leaves the uobject on the ufile list, but the dma_buf is freed as soon as the release returns. The cleanup then destroys the uobject and uses the freed dma_buf:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in uverbs_dmabuf_fd_destroy_uobj+0x46/0x200 Read of size 8 at addr ff11000109cf14b0 by task repro/435 Call Trace: uverbs_dmabuf_fd_destroy_uobj+0x46/0x200 destroy_hw_fd_uobject+0x3f/0x50 uverbs_destroy_uobject+0xc5/0x380 __uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0x1a8/0x260 uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x54/0x160 ib_uverbs_close+0x34/0x110 Allocated by task 435: dma_buf_export+0x1b5/0x530 ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_DMABUF_ALLOC+0x223/0x3f0 Freed by task 436: kfree+0x301/0x530 dentry_kill+0x14c/0x560 __fput+0x23a/0x4a0

rdma_user_mmap_entry_remove() dereferences the same pointer.

Protect the stored dma_buf pointer with a mutex and clear it before release returns. Use a shared revoke helper so uobject destruction and mmap entry removal both skip a cleared pointer. Hold a temporary uobject reference across uverbs_uobject_release() and the pointer update.

Use a separate mutex because uobject destruction can free the mmap entry before release finishes. Map and unmap use attachment->dmabuf directly, so they do not need to take the new mutex while holding the reservation lock.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99523"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:07Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/uverbs: Fix DMABUF use-after-free during ufile cleanup\n\nThe DMABUF release can race with ufile cleanup. When the cleanup holds\nhw_destroy_rwsem for write, uverbs_uobject_release() fails its trylock\nand leaves the uobject on the ufile list, but the dma_buf is freed as\nsoon as the release returns. The cleanup then destroys the uobject and\nuses the freed dma_buf:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in uverbs_dmabuf_fd_destroy_uobj+0x46/0x200\n  Read of size 8 at addr ff11000109cf14b0 by task repro/435\n  Call Trace:\n   uverbs_dmabuf_fd_destroy_uobj+0x46/0x200\n   destroy_hw_fd_uobject+0x3f/0x50\n   uverbs_destroy_uobject+0xc5/0x380\n   __uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0x1a8/0x260\n   uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x54/0x160\n   ib_uverbs_close+0x34/0x110\n  Allocated by task 435:\n   dma_buf_export+0x1b5/0x530\n   ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_DMABUF_ALLOC+0x223/0x3f0\n  Freed by task 436:\n   kfree+0x301/0x530\n   dentry_kill+0x14c/0x560\n   __fput+0x23a/0x4a0\n\nrdma_user_mmap_entry_remove() dereferences the same pointer.\n\nProtect the stored dma_buf pointer with a mutex and clear it before\nrelease returns. Use a shared revoke helper so uobject destruction and\nmmap entry removal both skip a cleared pointer. Hold a temporary uobject\nreference across uverbs_uobject_release() and the pointer update.\n\nUse a separate mutex because uobject destruction can free the mmap entry\nbefore release finishes. Map and unmap use attachment-\u003edmabuf directly,\nso they do not need to take the new mutex while holding the reservation\nlock.",
  "id": "GHSA-6j2g-qw4h-45f7",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99523"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b6d8b41af154b1137efb578afb8c8fc39d136aa"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2854f9025d4ef6c4566f71e52d7f496d9a0f5737"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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