{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "nl.nl-portal:taak"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49464"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-08T21:12:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nIn versions from 1.5.0 up to and including 3.0.0, any authenticated portal user could complete and tamper with another user\u0027s open task by submitting it on their behalf. The task submission endpoint accepted a task ID and a payload, but it never checked whether the task actually belonged to the user making the call.\n\nAn attacker who held a valid login (a normal `burger` OAuth token) and who knew or guessed another user\u0027s task ID could:\n\n- Mark someone else\u0027s task as completed.\n- Overwrite the data submitted with that task \u2014 the `verzonden_data` \u2014 with arbitrary input of their choosing.\n- Receive the full task back in the GraphQL response, including the form data that the legitimate owner had already entered. This leaks personal data belonging to the original user.\n\nFunctionally this means a malicious authenticated user could submit and alter forms in any other user\u0027s name, while at the same time reading what that user had previously filled in. Both the integrity of submitted data and the confidentiality of form contents are affected.\n\nThe vulnerable code was introduced together with the Taak V2 implementation (commit `bb1c1ecf`, 2024-06-04) and first shipped in the `1.5.x` release line. Earlier 1.x releases did not contain this resolver.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to **3.0.1** or later.\n\nFix commit: `8e699add` \u2014 \"Add auth check for task submission\".\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUntil the upgrade is applied, block the `submitTaakV2` GraphQL mutation at the API gateway, or restrict the `/graphql` endpoint to trusted networks.\n\n## Technical details\n\nThe resolver `nl.nlportal.zgw.taak.service.TaakService.submitTaakV2(id, submission, authentication)` fetched the task object by UUID and immediately transitioned it to the `AFGEROND` state, writing `record.data.portaalformulier.verzondenData` from caller-supplied input. No check verified that the task\u0027s `identificatie` matched the authenticated burger.\n\nThe fix adds a call to a new `isAuthorizedForTaak(authentication, objectsApiTask)` before the status change. The check compares `identificatie.type` and `identificatie.value` against the authenticated principal and validates the task\u0027s `eigenaar` for `bedrijf` `machtigingen`.\n\n## Credits\n\nDiscovered during the nl-portal-backend-libraries penetration testing engagement (phase 1, May 2026). Vendor attribution to be added before publication.",
  "id": "GHSA-6h3c-r723-7fx3",
  "modified": "2026-07-08T21:12:00Z",
  "published": "2026-07-08T21:12:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nl-portal/nl-portal-backend-libraries/security/advisories/GHSA-6h3c-r723-7fx3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nl-portal/nl-portal-backend-libraries"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NL Portal: IDOR allows any authenticated user to complete and tamper with another user\u0027s taak"
}