GHSA-6GW4-X63H-5499
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-10-19 20:40 – Updated: 2021-11-19 13:51Impact
The user may register in a shop by email mail@example.com, verify it, change it to the mail another@domain.com and stay verified and enabled. This may lead to having accounts addressed to totally different emails, that were verified. Note, that this way one is not able to take over any existing account (guest or normal one).
Patches
Patch has been provided for Sylius 1.6.x and newer - 1.6.9, 1.7.9, 1.8.3. Versions older than 1.6 are not covered by our security support anymore.
Workarounds
If for whatever reason you are not able to upgrade your application version, you may resolve this issue on your own by creating a custom event listener, which will listen to the sylius.customer.pre_update event. You can determine that email has been changed if customer email and user username are different. They are synchronized later on. Pay attention, to email changing behavior for administrators. You may need to skip this logic for them. In order to achieve this, you should either check master request path info, if it does not contain /admin prefix or adjust event triggered during customer update in the shop. You can find more information on how to customize the event here.
Acknowledgements
This security issue has been reported by Mircea Silviu (@decemvre), thanks a lot!
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Email us at security@sylius.com
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "sylius/sylius"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "sylius/sylius"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "sylius/sylius"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-15245"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-10-19T20:40:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-10-19T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe user may register in a shop by email mail@example.com, verify it, change it to the mail another@domain.com and stay verified and enabled. This may lead to having accounts addressed to totally different emails, that were verified. Note, that this way one is not able to take over any existing account (guest or normal one).\n\n### Patches\nPatch has been provided for Sylius 1.6.x and newer - 1.6.9, 1.7.9, 1.8.3. Versions older than 1.6 are not covered by our security support anymore.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf for whatever reason you are not able to upgrade your application version, you may resolve this issue on your own by creating a custom event listener, which will listen to the `sylius.customer.pre_update` event. You can determine that email has been changed if customer email and user username are different. They are synchronized later on. Pay attention, to email changing behavior for administrators. You may need to skip this logic for them. In order to achieve this, you should either check master request path info, if it does not contain `/admin` prefix or adjust event triggered during customer update in the shop. You can find more information on how to customize the event here.\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nThis security issue has been reported by Mircea Silviu (@decemvre), thanks a lot!\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Email us at [security@sylius.com](mailto:security@sylius.com)",
"id": "GHSA-6gw4-x63h-5499",
"modified": "2021-11-19T13:51:50Z",
"published": "2020-10-19T20:40:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Sylius/Sylius/security/advisories/GHSA-6gw4-x63h-5499"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15245"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Sylius/Sylius/commit/60636d711a4011e8694d10d201b53632c7e8ecaf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/sylius/sylius/CVE-2020-15245.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Sylius/Sylius"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Ability to switch customer email address on account detail page and stay verified"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.