GHSA-6GR4-52W6-VMQX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-17 22:30 – Updated: 2024-10-16 17:26Impact
When RKE provisions a cluster, it stores the cluster state in a configmap called full-cluster-state inside the kube-system namespace of the cluster itself. This cluster state object contains information used to set up the K8s cluster, which may include the following sensitive data:
- RancherKubernetesEngineConfig
- RKENodeConfig
- SSH username
- SSH private key
- SSH private key path
- RKEConfigServices
- ETCDService
- External client key
- BackupConfig
- S3BackupConfig
- AWS access key
- AWS secret key
- S3BackupConfig
- KubeAPIService
- SecretsEncryptionConfig
- K8s encryption configuration (contains encryption keys)
- SecretsEncryptionConfig
- ETCDService
- PrivateRegistries
- User
- Password
- ECRCredentialPlugin
- AWS access key
- AWS secret key
- AWS session token
- CloudProvider
- AzureCloudProvider
- AAD client ID
- AAD client secret
- AAD client cert password
- OpenstackCloudProvider
- Username
- User ID
- Password
- VsphereCloudProvider
- GlobalVsphereOpts
- User
- Password
- VirtualCenterConfig
- User
- Password
- GlobalVsphereOpts
- HarvesterCloudProvider
- CloudConfig
- CustomCloudProvider
- AzureCloudProvider
- BastionHost
- User
- SSH key
- CertificatesBundle
- Private key
- EncryptionConfig
- Private key
The State type that contains the above info and more can viewed here.
While the full-cluster-state configmap is not publicly available (reading it requires access to the RKE cluster), it being a configmap makes it available to non-administrators of the cluster. Because this configmap contains essentially all the information and credentials required to administer the cluster, anyone with permission to read it thereby achieves admin-level access to the cluster (please consult the MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Unsecured Credentials : Credentials In Files for further information about the associated technique of attack).
Important: For the exposure of credentials not related to Rancher and RKE, the final impact severity for confidentiality, integrity and availability is dependent on the permissions the leaked credentials have on their services.
It is recommended to review for potentially leaked credentials in this scenario and to change them if deemed necessary.
Patches
This vulnerability is being fixed in RKE versions 1.4.19 and 1.5.10 which are included in Rancher versions 2.7.14 and 2.8.5.
The patches include changes that will cause RKE to automatically migrate the cluster state configmap to a full-cluster-state secret in the kube-system namespace. The migrated secret will only be accessible to those who have read access to the kube-system namespace in the downstream RKE cluster. In Rancher, only admin and cluster-owner roles can access the secret. The old configmap will be removed after successful migration.
All downstream clusters provisioned using RKE via Rancher will be migrated automatically on Rancher upgrade. Note that any downstream clusters that are unavailable or otherwise non migratable on Rancher upgrade will still be migrated automatically as soon as they become available.
Clusters provisioned using RKE outside of Rancher will be migrated automatically upon the next invocation of rke up (i.e. the next cluster reconciliation) after upgrading RKE.
If a rollback needs to be performed after an upgrade to a patched Rancher or RKE version, downstream RKE clusters that were migrated need to have their migrations manually reversed using this script: https://github.com/rancherlabs/support-tools/tree/master/reverse-rke-state-migrations. Please be sure to back up downstream clusters before performing the reverse migration.
Workarounds
There are no workarounds for this issue. Users are recommended to upgrade, as soon as possible, to a version of RKE/Rancher Manager which contains the fixes.
Users should not attempt to perform this migration manually without upgrading their RKE/Rancher versions as only post-patch versions of RKE are capable of reading the cluster state from a secret instead of a configmap. In other words, migrating the cluster state to a secret without upgrading RKE/Rancher would cause RKE to be unable to read the cluster state, making it incapable of managing the cluster until an RKE/Rancher upgrade is performed.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries.
- Open an issue in the Rancher repository.
- Verify our support matrix and product support life cycle.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/rancher/rke"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.4.18"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/rancher/rke"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.5.9"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-32191"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-922"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-17T22:30:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-16T13:15:12Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nWhen RKE provisions a cluster, it stores the cluster state in a configmap called `full-cluster-state` inside the `kube-system` namespace of the cluster itself. This cluster state object contains information used to set up the K8s cluster, which may include the following sensitive data:\n\n- RancherKubernetesEngineConfig\n - RKENodeConfig\n - SSH username\n - SSH private key\n - SSH private key path\n - RKEConfigServices\n - ETCDService\n - External client key\n - BackupConfig\n - S3BackupConfig\n - AWS access key\n - AWS secret key\n - KubeAPIService\n - SecretsEncryptionConfig\n - K8s encryption configuration (contains encryption keys)\n - PrivateRegistries\n - User\n - Password\n - ECRCredentialPlugin\n - AWS access key\n - AWS secret key\n - AWS session token\n - CloudProvider\n - AzureCloudProvider\n - AAD client ID\n - AAD client secret\n - AAD client cert password\n - OpenstackCloudProvider\n - Username\n - User ID\n - Password\n - VsphereCloudProvider\n - GlobalVsphereOpts\n - User\n - Password\n - VirtualCenterConfig\n - User\n - Password\n - HarvesterCloudProvider\n - CloudConfig\n - CustomCloudProvider\n - BastionHost\n - User\n - SSH key\n- CertificatesBundle\n - Private key\n- EncryptionConfig\n - Private key\n\n\nThe `State` type that contains the above info and more can viewed [here](https://github.com/rancher/rke/blob/8714c3c06e0bad55c61684fd5d94f1481128c58d/cluster/state.go#L37).\n\nWhile the `full-cluster-state` configmap is not publicly available (reading it requires access to the RKE cluster), it being a configmap makes it available to non-administrators of the cluster. Because this configmap contains essentially all the information and credentials required to administer the cluster, anyone with permission to read it thereby achieves admin-level access to the cluster (please consult the [MITRE ATT\u0026CK - Technique - Unsecured Credentials : Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/) for further information about the associated technique of attack).\n\n\n**Important:**\nFor the exposure of credentials not related to Rancher and RKE, the final impact severity for confidentiality, integrity and availability is dependent on the permissions the leaked credentials have on their services. \n\n\nIt is recommended to review for potentially leaked credentials in this scenario and to change them if deemed necessary.\n\n\n### Patches\n\nThis vulnerability is being fixed in RKE versions `1.4.19` and `1.5.10` which are included in Rancher versions `2.7.14` and `2.8.5`.\n\n\nThe patches include changes that will cause RKE to automatically migrate the cluster state configmap to a `full-cluster-state` secret in the `kube-system` namespace. The migrated secret will only be accessible to those who have read access to the `kube-system` namespace in the downstream RKE cluster. In Rancher, only admin and cluster-owner roles can access the secret. The old configmap will be removed after successful migration.\n\n\nAll downstream clusters provisioned using RKE via Rancher will be migrated automatically on Rancher upgrade. Note that any downstream clusters that are unavailable or otherwise non migratable on Rancher upgrade will still be migrated automatically as soon as they become available.\n\n\nClusters provisioned using RKE outside of Rancher will be migrated automatically upon the next invocation of `rke up` (i.e. the next cluster reconciliation) after upgrading RKE.\n\n\nIf a rollback needs to be performed after an upgrade to a patched Rancher or RKE version, downstream RKE clusters that were migrated need to have their migrations manually reversed using this script: https://github.com/rancherlabs/support-tools/tree/master/reverse-rke-state-migrations. \n**Please be sure to back up downstream clusters before performing the reverse migration**.\n\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no workarounds for this issue. Users are recommended to upgrade, as soon as possible, to a version of RKE/Rancher Manager which contains the fixes.\n\n\nUsers should not attempt to perform this migration manually without upgrading their RKE/Rancher versions as only post-patch versions of RKE are capable of reading the cluster state from a secret instead of a configmap. In other words, migrating the cluster state to a secret without upgrading RKE/Rancher would cause RKE to be unable to read the cluster state, making it incapable of managing the cluster until an RKE/Rancher upgrade is performed.\n\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n\n- Reach out to the [SUSE Rancher Security team](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/policy) for security related inquiries.\n- Open an issue in the [Rancher](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/issues/new/choose) repository.\n- Verify our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-rancher/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/) and [product support life cycle](https://www.suse.com/lifecycle/).\n",
"id": "GHSA-6gr4-52w6-vmqx",
"modified": "2024-10-16T17:26:10Z",
"published": "2024-06-17T22:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rancher/rke/security/advisories/GHSA-6gr4-52w6-vmqx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32191"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rancher/rke/commit/cf49199481a1891909acb1384eed73a5c987d5bd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rancher/rke/commit/f7485b8dce376db0fc15a7c3ceb3de7029c8d0cf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2023-32191"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rancher/rke"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "rke\u0027s credentials are stored in the RKE1 Cluster state ConfigMap"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.