GHSA-6GQW-JQV7-V88M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:43 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:43Summary
On a multi-tenant stigmem node, a caller holding a write credential for one tenant can run a decay sweep that acts on every tenant's facts. The candidate-selection queries in lifecycle/decay.py (_select_ttl_candidates, _select_confidence_candidates) carried no tenant_id predicate, and the caller's tenant was not threaded into the sweep or its async worker (run_decay_sweep / _decay_job_worker), reached via POST /v1/decay/sweep.
Impact
A sweep with ttl_seconds=0 expires all tenants' facts — cross-tenant data destruction (integrity and availability). A dry_run sweep returns a global candidate count, acting as a cross-tenant existence/volume oracle (information disclosure).
Affected configurations
This is a cross-tenant break. It is exploitable only on deployments running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only tenant="default" — there is no second tenant to cross — so it is not exploitable on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate.
Patches
Fixed in 0.9.0a12 (PR #728): identity.tenant_id is threaded into run_decay_sweep and _decay_job_worker, and AND tenant_id = ? was added to the candidate selectors and the graph-sync. A tenant-B sweep now leaves tenant-A facts untouched, and dry_run counts only the caller's tenant. The check_fact_query_tenant_scope.py CI guard was extended to scan lifecycle/ so this class cannot silently regress.
Workarounds
None other than upgrading to 0.9.0a12. Single-tenant deployments are unaffected.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "stigmem-node"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0a12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:43:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nOn a multi-tenant stigmem node, a caller holding a `write` credential for **one** tenant can run a decay sweep that acts on **every** tenant\u0027s facts. The candidate-selection queries in `lifecycle/decay.py` (`_select_ttl_candidates`, `_select_confidence_candidates`) carried no `tenant_id` predicate, and the caller\u0027s tenant was not threaded into the sweep or its async worker (`run_decay_sweep` / `_decay_job_worker`), reached via `POST /v1/decay/sweep`.\n\n### Impact\nA sweep with `ttl_seconds=0` expires **all tenants\u0027** facts \u2014 cross-tenant data destruction (integrity and availability). A `dry_run` sweep returns a global candidate count, acting as a cross-tenant existence/volume **oracle** (information disclosure).\n\n### Affected configurations\nThis is a cross-**tenant** break. It is exploitable **only** on deployments running the opt-in `stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant` (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only `tenant=\"default\"` \u2014 there is no second tenant to cross \u2014 so it is **not exploitable** on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in `0.9.0a12` (PR #728): `identity.tenant_id` is threaded into `run_decay_sweep` and `_decay_job_worker`, and `AND tenant_id = ?` was added to the candidate selectors and the graph-sync. A tenant-B sweep now leaves tenant-A facts untouched, and `dry_run` counts only the caller\u0027s tenant. The `check_fact_query_tenant_scope.py` CI guard was extended to scan `lifecycle/` so this class cannot silently regress.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone other than upgrading to `0.9.0a12`. Single-tenant deployments are unaffected.",
"id": "GHSA-6gqw-jqv7-v88m",
"modified": "2026-06-19T21:43:03Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T21:43:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/security/advisories/GHSA-6gqw-jqv7-v88m"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/pull/728"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "stigmem-node: decay sweep expires and counts facts across all tenants (cross-tenant BOLA)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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