GHSA-6FQW-J3VM-7F66
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-07 22:27 – Updated: 2024-06-07 22:27The implementation of ORDER BY and GROUP BY in Zend_Db_Select remained prone to SQL injection when a combination of SQL expressions and comments were used. This security patch provides a comprehensive solution that identifies and removes comments prior to checking validity of the statement to ensure no SQLi vectors occur.
The implementation of ORDER BY and GROUP BY in Zend_Db_Select of ZF1 is vulnerable by the following SQL injection:
$db = Zend_Db::factory(/* options here */);
$select = new Zend_Db_Select($db);
$select->from('p');
$select->order("MD5(\"a(\");DELETE FROM p2; #)"); // same with group()
The above $select will render the following SQL statement:
SELECT `p`.* FROM `p` ORDER BY MD5("a(");DELETE FROM p2; #) ASC
instead of the correct one:
SELECT "p".* FROM "p" ORDER BY "MD5(""a("");DELETE FROM p2; #)" ASC
This security fix can be considered an improvement of the previous ZF2016-02 and ZF2014-04 advisories.
As a final consideration, we recommend developers either never use user input for these operations, or filter user input thoroughly prior to invoking Zend_Db. You can use the Zend_Db_Select::quoteInto() method to filter the input data, as shown in this example:
$db = Zend_Db::factory(...);
$input = "MD5(\"a(\");DELETE FROM p2; #)"; // user input can be an attack
$order = $db->quoteInto("SQL statement for ORDER", $input);
$select = new Zend_Db_Select($db);
$select->from('p');
$select->order($order); // same with group()
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "zendframework/zendframework1"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.12.20"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-07T22:27:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The implementation of ORDER BY and GROUP BY in Zend_Db_Select remained prone to SQL injection when a combination of SQL expressions and comments were used. This security patch provides a comprehensive solution that identifies and removes comments prior to checking validity of the statement to ensure no SQLi vectors occur.\n\nThe implementation of ORDER BY and GROUP BY in Zend_Db_Select of ZF1 is vulnerable by the following SQL injection:\n```\n$db = Zend_Db::factory(/* options here */);\n$select = new Zend_Db_Select($db);\n$select-\u003efrom(\u0027p\u0027);\n$select-\u003eorder(\"MD5(\\\"a(\\\");DELETE FROM p2; #)\"); // same with group()\n```\nThe above $select will render the following SQL statement:\n```\nSELECT `p`.* FROM `p` ORDER BY MD5(\"a(\");DELETE FROM p2; #) ASC\n```\ninstead of the correct one:\n```\nSELECT \"p\".* FROM \"p\" ORDER BY \"MD5(\"\"a(\"\");DELETE FROM p2; #)\" ASC\n```\nThis security fix can be considered an improvement of the previous ZF2016-02 and ZF2014-04 advisories.\n\nAs a final consideration, we recommend developers either never use user input for these operations, or filter user input thoroughly prior to invoking Zend_Db. You can use the Zend_Db_Select::quoteInto() method to filter the input data, as shown in this example:\n```\n$db = Zend_Db::factory(...);\n$input = \"MD5(\\\"a(\\\");DELETE FROM p2; #)\"; // user input can be an attack\n$order = $db-\u003equoteInto(\"SQL statement for ORDER\", $input);\n\n$select = new Zend_Db_Select($db);\n$select-\u003efrom(\u0027p\u0027);\n$select-\u003eorder($order); // same with group()\n```",
"id": "GHSA-6fqw-j3vm-7f66",
"modified": "2024-06-07T22:27:32Z",
"published": "2024-06-07T22:27:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://framework.zend.com/security/advisory/ZF2016-03"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/zendframework/zendframework1/ZF2016-03.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/zendframework/zf1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Zendframework1 Potential SQL injection in ORDER and GROUP functions"
}
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