GHSA-6F8Q-4CVP-FR9Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Avoid double completion in async IOCB timeout

qla2x00_async_iocb_timeout() tries to abort a timed-out async IOCB. When qla24xx_async_abort_cmd() fails, both the SRB_LOGIN_CMD path and the SRB_CTRL_VP/default path scan outstanding_cmds[] for the SRB and then call sp->done(sp, QLA_FUNCTION_TIMEOUT) unconditionally, without checking whether the SRB was actually found and removed.

If the response ISR completes the same handle first, it removes the SRB under qp_lock_ptr and runs sp->done() -> complete(sp->comp). The submitter qla24xx_control_vp() wakes from wait_for_completion(), clears sp->comp, drops its reference and returns, reclaiming the on-stack completion. The timer reference keeps the SRB alive across the timeout handler, but not the submitter's stack. The timeout then issues a second sp->done() -> qla_ctrlvp_sp_done(), which evaluates "if (sp->comp) complete(sp->comp)"; with the pointer loaded before the submitter's NULL store, complete() writes into the freed stack frame, a use-after-free.

Track whether this path removed the SRB from outstanding_cmds and only call sp->done() when it did, so the command is completed exactly once by whichever path owns it. This mirrors the sp_found guard already used in qla24xx_abort_iocb_timeout().

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-89847"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:16:51Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Avoid double completion in async IOCB timeout\n\nqla2x00_async_iocb_timeout() tries to abort a timed-out async IOCB. When\nqla24xx_async_abort_cmd() fails, both the SRB_LOGIN_CMD path and the\nSRB_CTRL_VP/default path scan outstanding_cmds[] for the SRB and then\ncall sp-\u003edone(sp, QLA_FUNCTION_TIMEOUT) unconditionally, without checking\nwhether the SRB was actually found and removed.\n\nIf the response ISR completes the same handle first, it removes the SRB\nunder qp_lock_ptr and runs sp-\u003edone() -\u003e complete(sp-\u003ecomp). The\nsubmitter qla24xx_control_vp() wakes from wait_for_completion(), clears\nsp-\u003ecomp, drops its reference and returns, reclaiming the on-stack\ncompletion. The timer reference keeps the SRB alive across the timeout\nhandler, but not the submitter\u0027s stack. The timeout then issues a second\nsp-\u003edone() -\u003e qla_ctrlvp_sp_done(), which evaluates \"if (sp-\u003ecomp)\ncomplete(sp-\u003ecomp)\"; with the pointer loaded before the submitter\u0027s NULL\nstore, complete() writes into the freed stack frame, a use-after-free.\n\nTrack whether this path removed the SRB from outstanding_cmds and only\ncall sp-\u003edone() when it did, so the command is completed exactly once by\nwhichever path owns it. This mirrors the sp_found guard already used in\nqla24xx_abort_iocb_timeout().",
  "id": "GHSA-6f8q-4cvp-fr9q",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T15:30:59Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T12:30:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89847"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e217a9482eabbd8b29847be334c74cf468d3544"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71a7b6e3c7f121439f51a058e53d4a8e05b63dec"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7257b5e1fb6c9387714f66e01b79ec82b717eede"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/845d4abd92cd2f97551356c8b281ad6e197acb07"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fa1d71233a82416492d9c9de9756ebe140fe714"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb45bc4bd53c95a7bf6f782577b5ede94c0f8aa8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6d856c722f40f0694ff755208552e658db6dd42"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5b660e0b0d9190d8853c795c2522cc5f8c93003"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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