GHSA-6F8J-3PX9-H4JJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-18 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject accept queue add unless BT_LISTEN
New sk should not be added to parent socket accept queue after last l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has run in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() and state set to BT_CLOSED, as that can result to UAF on dereferencing the dangling parent reference.
l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() may race with parent l2cap_chan teardown, due to chan->state accessed without consistent locking:
[Task 1] [Task 2] l2cap_sock_release(parent) l2cap_connect l2cap_sock_shutdown pchan = l2cap_global_chan_by_psm l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) l2cap_chan_close l2cap_sock_teardown_cb pchan->state = BT_CLOSED l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan) ------> l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) l2cap_new_connection l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) <-------- l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan) l2cap_sock_kill(parent) / bt_sk(sk)->parent dangling /
Fix by adding check for sk_state == BT_LISTEN after acquiring sk lock in l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb(). Add lock_sock() around sk_state writes where missing, to avoid data races.
Although the data races on pchan->state should be fixed too, this defensive sk_state check probably makes sense in any case.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90092"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: reject accept queue add unless BT_LISTEN\n\nNew sk should not be added to parent socket accept queue after last\nl2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has run in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() and\nstate set to BT_CLOSED, as that can result to UAF on dereferencing the\ndangling parent reference.\n\nl2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() may race with parent l2cap_chan teardown,\ndue to chan-\u003estate accessed without consistent locking:\n\n [Task 1] [Task 2]\n l2cap_sock_release(parent) l2cap_connect\n l2cap_sock_shutdown pchan = l2cap_global_chan_by_psm\n l2cap_chan_lock(pchan)\n l2cap_chan_close\n l2cap_sock_teardown_cb\n pchan-\u003estate = BT_CLOSED\n l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan) ------\u003e l2cap_chan_lock(pchan)\n l2cap_new_connection\n l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb\n l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) \u003c-------- l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan)\n l2cap_sock_kill(parent) /* bt_sk(sk)-\u003eparent dangling */\n\nFix by adding check for sk_state == BT_LISTEN after acquiring sk lock in\nl2cap_sock_new_connection_cb(). Add lock_sock() around sk_state writes\nwhere missing, to avoid data races.\n\nAlthough the data races on pchan-\u003estate should be fixed too, this\ndefensive sk_state check probably makes sense in any case.",
"id": "GHSA-6f8j-3px9-h4jj",
"modified": "2026-09-18T18:31:26Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90092"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a3a27aaf19bf069720e024ce6fde54e6bf80df9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/491e4c60017969b053888029998d2a61f298986a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87276dc15b559d32757a43b4415c8445fbae06c4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf61a65c6093970e3b50031c4b79ebf3bd411eba"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c47339e169bf4a0a4cfabb91351471f67744c2bc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4bfa78fd67929b62b02013c107973e0c5b7aa9a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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