GHSA-6F54-3QR9-PJGJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-01-30 21:22 – Updated: 2021-01-08 20:32Impact
Media publication via OAI-PMH allows unauthenticated public access to all media and metadata by default. OAI-PMH is part of the default workflow and is activated by default, requiring active user intervention of users to protect media. This leads to users unknowingly handing out public access to events without their knowledge.
Patches
The problem has been addressed in Opencast 7.6 and 8.1 where the OAI-PMH endpoint is configured to require users with ROLE_ADMIN by default. In addition to this, Opencast 9 removes the OAI-PMH publication from the default workflow, making the publication a conscious decision users have to make by updating their workflows.
Workarounds
In the organization security configuration (etc/security/mh_default_org.xml), change the roles required for accessing /oaipmh from ROLE_ANONYMOUS to ROLE_ADMIN.
References
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Open an issue in opencast/opencast
- For security-relevant information, email us at security@opencast.org
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.opencastproject:opencast-oaipmh-api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.opencastproject:opencast-oaipmh-api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-5228"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-01-30T19:48:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nMedia publication via OAI-PMH allows unauthenticated public access to all media and metadata by default. OAI-PMH is part of the default workflow and is activated by default, requiring active user intervention of users to protect media. This leads to users unknowingly handing out public access to events without their knowledge.\n\n\n### Patches\n\nThe problem has been addressed in Opencast 7.6 and 8.1 where the OAI-PMH endpoint is configured to require users with `ROLE_ADMIN` by default. In addition to this, Opencast 9 removes the OAI-PMH publication from the default workflow, making the publication a conscious decision users have to make by updating their workflows.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIn the organization security configuration (`etc/security/mh_default_org.xml`), change the roles required for accessing `/oaipmh` from `ROLE_ANONYMOUS` to `ROLE_ADMIN`.\n\n### References\n\n- [Public access configuration in the organization\u0027s security configuration](https://github.com/opencast/opencast/blob/1fb812c7810c78f09f29a7f455ff920417924307/etc/security/mh_default_org.xml#L271-L276)\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n- Open an issue in [opencast/opencast](https://github.com/opencast/opencast/issues)\n- For security-relevant information, email us at security@opencast.org",
"id": "GHSA-6f54-3qr9-pjgj",
"modified": "2021-01-08T20:32:00Z",
"published": "2020-01-30T21:22:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/opencast/opencast/security/advisories/GHSA-6f54-3qr9-pjgj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5228"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/opencast/opencast/blob/1fb812c7810c78f09f29a7f455ff920417924307/etc/security/mh_default_org.xml#L271-L276"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Unauthenticated Access Via OAI-PMH"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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