GHSA-69XG-F649-W5G2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 20:02 – Updated: 2026-03-13 20:02
VLAI
Summary
Parse Server OAuth2 adapter app ID validation sends wrong token to introspection endpoint
Details

Impact

The OAuth2 authentication adapter does not correctly validate app IDs when appidField and appIds are configured. During app ID validation, a malformed value is sent to the token introspection endpoint instead of the user's actual access token. Depending on the introspection endpoint's behavior, this could either cause all OAuth2 logins to fail, or allow authentication from disallowed app contexts if the endpoint returns valid-looking data for the malformed request.

Deployments using the OAuth2 adapter with appidField and appIds configured are affected.

Patches

The fix corrects the parameter alignment in the OAuth2 adapter's app ID validation method to match the expected interface, ensuring the correct access token is sent to the introspection endpoint.

Workarounds

There is no known workaround.

References

  • GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2
  • Fix in Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.6.0-alpha.13
  • Fix in Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.39
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "parse-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.6.0-alpha.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "parse-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.6.39"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32269"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-683"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T20:02:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T20:16:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe OAuth2 authentication adapter does not correctly validate app IDs when `appidField` and `appIds` are configured. During app ID validation, a malformed value is sent to the token introspection endpoint instead of the user\u0027s actual access token. Depending on the introspection endpoint\u0027s behavior, this could either cause all OAuth2 logins to fail, or allow authentication from disallowed app contexts if the endpoint returns valid-looking data for the malformed request.\n\nDeployments using the OAuth2 adapter with `appidField` and `appIds` configured are affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix corrects the parameter alignment in the OAuth2 adapter\u0027s app ID validation method to match the expected interface, ensuring the correct access token is sent to the introspection endpoint.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no known workaround.\n\n### References\n\n- GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2\n- Fix in Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.6.0-alpha.13\n- Fix in Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.39",
  "id": "GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2",
  "modified": "2026-03-13T20:02:25Z",
  "published": "2026-03-13T20:02:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32269"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.39"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.6.0-alpha.13"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Parse Server OAuth2 adapter app ID validation sends wrong token to introspection endpoint"
}



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