GHSA-69V9-Q4H9-VWCH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: do not copy up an xattr value that was never read
Copy-up stores uninitialized kernel memory in an xattr of the upper file, where the user can read it.
ovl_copy_xattr() may only pass bytes to ovl_do_setxattr() that ovl_do_getxattr() has read. When the read fails with -ERANGE the function asks for the size again, and if the new size fits the buffer it stores the buffer although nothing was read into it. The buffer comes from kvmalloc(), or it still holds the value of the previous xattr.
A FUSE lower layer that answers every sized GETXATTR with -ERANGE made copy-up store 4096 bytes that the server never sent, with a kernel pointer in them, as an xattr of the upper file.
Fix this by failing the copy-up with -EIO when the size that follows -ERANGE fits the buffer.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99418"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:54Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\novl: do not copy up an xattr value that was never read\n\nCopy-up stores uninitialized kernel memory in an xattr of the upper\nfile, where the user can read it.\n\novl_copy_xattr() may only pass bytes to ovl_do_setxattr() that\novl_do_getxattr() has read. When the read fails with -ERANGE the\nfunction asks for the size again, and if the new size fits the buffer\nit stores the buffer although nothing was read into it. The buffer\ncomes from kvmalloc(), or it still holds the value of the previous\nxattr.\n\nA FUSE lower layer that answers every sized GETXATTR with -ERANGE made\ncopy-up store 4096 bytes that the server never sent, with a kernel\npointer in them, as an xattr of the upper file.\n\nFix this by failing the copy-up with -EIO when the size that follows\n-ERANGE fits the buffer.",
"id": "GHSA-69v9-q4h9-vwch",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:24Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99418"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b1f5a4652539014f0162944f1a5f71ee520188a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/628260a7204314ab5f1cd93bddb1721cc0226b38"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/755b5c5c9277be251a51623d6065abab948c61bc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e35c3b1dc69b8c8efe3d751fafb9b50a85f0e2f7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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