GHSA-694X-MWH7-5PVF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 06:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: clear intr_entry in fuse_resend and fuse_remove_pending_req
When fuse_resend() moves a request from fpq->processing back to fiq->pending, it sets FR_PENDING and clears FR_SENT but does not remove the requests intr_entry from fiq->interrupts. If the request had FR_INTERRUPTED set from a prior signal, intr_entry remains dangling on fiq->interrupts. When the requesting task then receives a fatal signal, fuse_remove_pending_req() sees FR_PENDING=1, removes the request from fiq->pending and frees it via the refcount path, also without cleaning intr_entry. The stale intr_entry causes use-after-free when fuse_read_interrupt() iterates fiq->interrupts: - list_del_init(&req->intr_entry) -> UAF write on freed slab - req->in.h.unique -> UAF read, data leaked to userspace
Remove intr_entry from fiq->interrupts in fuse_resend() for interrupted requests before they are placed back on fiq->pending.
Add a WARN_ON if the intr_entry is not empty on request destruction.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64265"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfuse: clear intr_entry in fuse_resend and fuse_remove_pending_req\n\nWhen fuse_resend() moves a request from fpq-\u003eprocessing back to\nfiq-\u003epending, it sets FR_PENDING and clears FR_SENT but does not\nremove the requests intr_entry from fiq-\u003einterrupts. If the\nrequest had FR_INTERRUPTED set from a prior signal, intr_entry\nremains dangling on fiq-\u003einterrupts. When the requesting task\nthen receives a fatal signal, fuse_remove_pending_req() sees\nFR_PENDING=1, removes the request from fiq-\u003epending and frees it\nvia the refcount path, also without cleaning intr_entry. The\nstale intr_entry causes use-after-free when fuse_read_interrupt()\niterates fiq-\u003einterrupts:\n - list_del_init(\u0026req-\u003eintr_entry) -\u003e UAF write on freed slab\n - req-\u003ein.h.unique -\u003e UAF read, data leaked to userspace\n\nRemove intr_entry from fiq-\u003einterrupts in fuse_resend() for\ninterrupted requests before they are placed back on fiq-\u003epending.\n\nAdd a WARN_ON if the intr_entry is not empty on request destruction.",
"id": "GHSA-694x-mwh7-5pvf",
"modified": "2026-07-27T06:30:31Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64265"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d8ecd0cd696a5df0b2f72046a4ccee5d2a8ec2c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7366e6f4d2b4c7002b13fb01219e83679dad4127"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/893479015cb6442fd389d3b553ab3036c9541715"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8fce75fedf73ac72aa09163deb8f4291fdcaad2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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