GHSA-68P8-JJXW-W2V4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-12 15:31 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: do not leave a dangling sk pointer, when socket creation fails
It is possible to trigger a use-after-free by: * attaching an fentry probe to __sock_release() and the probe calling the bpf_get_socket_cookie() helper * running traceroute -I 1.1.1.1 on a freshly booted VM
A KASAN enabled kernel will log something like below (decoded and stripped):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888007110dd8 by task traceroute/299
CPU: 2 PID: 299 Comm: traceroute Tainted: G E 6.10.0-rc2+ #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117 (discriminator 1)) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:488) ? __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:603) ? __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29) kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:183 mm/kasan/generic.c:189) __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29) bpf_get_socket_ptr_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:94 ./include/linux/sock_diag.h:42 net/core/filter.c:5094 net/core/filter.c:5092) bpf_prog_875642cf11f1d139___sock_release+0x6e/0x8e bpf_trampoline_6442506592+0x47/0xaf __sock_release (net/socket.c:652) __sock_create (net/socket.c:1601) ... Allocated by task 299 on cpu 2 at 78.328492s: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48) kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:68) __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:312 mm/kasan/common.c:338) kmem_cache_alloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:3941 mm/slub.c:4000 mm/slub.c:4007) sk_prot_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2075) sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2134) inet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:327 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252) __sock_create (net/socket.c:1572) __sys_socket (net/socket.c:1660 net/socket.c:1644 net/socket.c:1706) __x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1718) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
Freed by task 299 on cpu 2 at 78.328502s: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48) kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:68) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:582) poison_slab_object (mm/kasan/common.c:242) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:256) kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:4437 mm/slub.c:4511) __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2117 net/core/sock.c:2208) inet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:397 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252) __sock_create (net/socket.c:1572) __sys_socket (net/socket.c:1660 net/socket.c:1644 net/socket.c:1706) __x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1718) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
Fix this by clearing the struct socket reference in sk_common_release() to cover all protocol families create functions, which may already attached the reference to the sk object with sock_init_data().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-40954"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-12T13:15:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: do not leave a dangling sk pointer, when socket creation fails\n\nIt is possible to trigger a use-after-free by:\n * attaching an fentry probe to __sock_release() and the probe calling the\n bpf_get_socket_cookie() helper\n * running traceroute -I 1.1.1.1 on a freshly booted VM\n\nA KASAN enabled kernel will log something like below (decoded and stripped):\n==================================================================\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff888007110dd8 by task traceroute/299\n\nCPU: 2 PID: 299 Comm: traceroute Tainted: G E 6.10.0-rc2+ #2\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\ndump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117 (discriminator 1))\nprint_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:488)\n? __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)\nkasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:603)\n? __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)\nkasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:183 mm/kasan/generic.c:189)\n__sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)\nbpf_get_socket_ptr_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:94 ./include/linux/sock_diag.h:42 net/core/filter.c:5094 net/core/filter.c:5092)\nbpf_prog_875642cf11f1d139___sock_release+0x6e/0x8e\nbpf_trampoline_6442506592+0x47/0xaf\n__sock_release (net/socket.c:652)\n__sock_create (net/socket.c:1601)\n...\nAllocated by task 299 on cpu 2 at 78.328492s:\nkasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)\nkasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:68)\n__kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:312 mm/kasan/common.c:338)\nkmem_cache_alloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:3941 mm/slub.c:4000 mm/slub.c:4007)\nsk_prot_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2075)\nsk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2134)\ninet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:327 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252)\n__sock_create (net/socket.c:1572)\n__sys_socket (net/socket.c:1660 net/socket.c:1644 net/socket.c:1706)\n__x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1718)\ndo_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)\nentry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)\n\nFreed by task 299 on cpu 2 at 78.328502s:\nkasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)\nkasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:68)\nkasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:582)\npoison_slab_object (mm/kasan/common.c:242)\n__kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:256)\nkmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:4437 mm/slub.c:4511)\n__sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2117 net/core/sock.c:2208)\ninet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:397 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252)\n__sock_create (net/socket.c:1572)\n__sys_socket (net/socket.c:1660 net/socket.c:1644 net/socket.c:1706)\n__x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1718)\ndo_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)\nentry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)\n\nFix this by clearing the struct socket reference in sk_common_release() to cover\nall protocol families create functions, which may already attached the\nreference to the sk object with sock_init_data().",
"id": "GHSA-68p8-jjxw-w2v4",
"modified": "2025-11-04T00:30:55Z",
"published": "2024-07-12T15:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40954"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/454c454ed645fed051216b79622f7cb69c1638f5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5dfe2408fd7dc4d2e7ac38a116ff0a37b1cfd3b9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6cd4a78d962bebbaf8beb7d2ead3f34120e3f7b2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78e4aa528a7b1204219d808310524344f627d069"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/893eeba94c40d513cd0fe6539330ebdaea208c0e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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