GHSA-6828-FJ37-MVWR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-06-25 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: restore reservation on error in hugetlb folio copy paths
Two sites in mm/hugetlb.c allocate a hugetlb folio via alloc_hugetlb_folio() (consuming a VMA reservation) and then call copy_user_large_folio(), which became int-returning in commit 1cb9dc4b475c ("mm: hwpoison: support recovery from HugePage copy-on-write faults") and can now fail (e.g. -EHWPOISON on a hwpoisoned source page). On the failure path, folio_put() restores the global hugetlb pool count through free_huge_folio(), but the per-VMA reservation map entry is left marked consumed:
- hugetlb_mfill_atomic_pte() resubmission path (UFFDIO_COPY)
- copy_hugetlb_page_range() fork-time CoW path when hugetlb_try_dup_anon_rmap() fails (rare: pinned hugetlb anon folio under fork)
User-visible effect: on UFFDIO_COPY into a private hugetlb VMA where the resubmission copy fails, the reservation for that address is leaked from the VMA's reserve map. A subsequent fault at the same address takes the no-reservation path, and under hugetlb pool pressure the task is SIGBUSed at an address it had previously reserved. The fork-time CoW path leaks the same way in the child VMA's reserve map, though it requires the much rarer combination of pinned hugetlb anon page + hwpoisoned source.
Add the missing restore_reserve_on_error() call before folio_put() on both error paths.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53154"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:32Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/hugetlb: restore reservation on error in hugetlb folio copy paths\n\nTwo sites in mm/hugetlb.c allocate a hugetlb folio via\nalloc_hugetlb_folio() (consuming a VMA reservation) and then call\ncopy_user_large_folio(), which became int-returning in commit 1cb9dc4b475c\n(\"mm: hwpoison: support recovery from HugePage copy-on-write faults\") and\ncan now fail (e.g. -EHWPOISON on a hwpoisoned source page). On the\nfailure path, folio_put() restores the global hugetlb pool count through\nfree_huge_folio(), but the per-VMA reservation map entry is left marked\nconsumed:\n\n - hugetlb_mfill_atomic_pte() resubmission path (UFFDIO_COPY)\n - copy_hugetlb_page_range() fork-time CoW path when\n hugetlb_try_dup_anon_rmap() fails (rare: pinned hugetlb anon\n folio under fork)\n\nUser-visible effect: on UFFDIO_COPY into a private hugetlb VMA where the\nresubmission copy fails, the reservation for that address is leaked from\nthe VMA\u0027s reserve map. A subsequent fault at the same address takes the\nno-reservation path, and under hugetlb pool pressure the task is SIGBUSed\nat an address it had previously reserved. The fork-time CoW path leaks\nthe same way in the child VMA\u0027s reserve map, though it requires the much\nrarer combination of pinned hugetlb anon page + hwpoisoned source.\n\nAdd the missing restore_reserve_on_error() call before folio_put() on both\nerror paths.",
"id": "GHSA-6828-fj37-mvwr",
"modified": "2026-06-25T09:31:19Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T09:31:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53154"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40c81856e622a9dc59294a90d169ac07ea25b0b0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45e33d43243d71d089af42f5077b8213cee6610f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d6e1dd3ad1340cd8b6d554b7aa93d8f0a1c6d38"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c72469ac0f274bde3f0df60a4584e14a123d0aa6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e47bf16af3c45470ea32f2241fa69aefe0dd61bd"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
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