GHSA-67PM-PW7X-4R44
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: validate transport name in listener_set before serv creation
nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() holds nfsd_mutex for the whole listener teardown and rebuild. The code checks NFSD_A_SOCK_TRANSPORT_NAME for presence only, and not for content. An arbitrary name therefore reaches svc_xprt_create_from_sa(). There, a name that matches no registered class calls request_module("svc%s", name). That call is a TASK_KILLABLE usermode helper upcall, and it runs under nfsd_mutex.
Check the name against the classes that NFSD can create: tcp, udp and rdma. The check goes in nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(), which runs before the code takes nfsd_mutex. The rejection names the offending attribute through extack, since -EPROTONOSUPPORT on its own does not say which entry carried the bad name.
This narrows the upcall. It does not remove it. NFSD accepts "rdma" without a condition, so on a kernel that does not build svcrdma the name still reaches request_module("svcrdma") under nfsd_mutex. That is necessary for the modular case, where the autoload is legitimate.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99359"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:47Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFSD: validate transport name in listener_set before serv creation\n\nnfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() holds nfsd_mutex for the whole listener\nteardown and rebuild. The code checks NFSD_A_SOCK_TRANSPORT_NAME for\npresence only, and not for content. An arbitrary name therefore reaches\nsvc_xprt_create_from_sa(). There, a name that matches no registered class\ncalls request_module(\"svc%s\", name). That call is a TASK_KILLABLE usermode\nhelper upcall, and it runs under nfsd_mutex.\n\nCheck the name against the classes that NFSD can create: tcp, udp and\nrdma. The check goes in nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(), which runs before\nthe code takes nfsd_mutex. The rejection names the offending attribute\nthrough extack, since -EPROTONOSUPPORT on its own does not say which\nentry carried the bad name.\n\nThis narrows the upcall. It does not remove it. NFSD accepts \"rdma\"\nwithout a condition, so on a kernel that does not build svcrdma the name\nstill reaches request_module(\"svcrdma\") under nfsd_mutex. That is\nnecessary for the modular case, where the autoload is legitimate.",
"id": "GHSA-67pm-pw7x-4r44",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99359"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/421becdc5cf4d7d2fbda393e78ca76d25d277c0f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49f6570e1a8989268cfb71448e3d301c5c850c2d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90202cf720f47d4183b4da8ef43bed7dfec0c572"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5a336ad931afdd609c809cea4b3d910e781bd6f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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