GHSA-67P5-53X6-9J7Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix double-free of tx_buf skb
If ice_tso() or ice_tx_csum() fail, the error path in ice_xmit_frame_ring() frees the skb, but the 'first' tx_buf still points to it and is marked as valid (ICE_TX_BUF_SKB). 'next_to_use' remains unchanged, so the potential problem will likely fix itself when the next packet is transmitted and the tx_buf gets overwritten. But if there is no next packet and the interface is brought down instead, ice_clean_tx_ring() -> ice_unmap_and_free_tx_buf() will find the tx_buf and free the skb for the second time.
The fix is to reset the tx_buf type to ICE_TX_BUF_EMPTY in the error path, so that ice_unmap_and_free_tx_buf(). Move the initialization of 'first' up, to ensure it's already valid in case we hit the linearization error path.
The bug was spotted by AI while I had it looking for something else. It also proposed an initial version of the patch.
I reproduced the bug and tested the fix by adding code to inject failures, on a build with KASAN.
I looked for similar bugs in related Intel drivers and did not find any.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53009"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1341",
"CWE-415",
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nice: fix double-free of tx_buf skb\n\nIf ice_tso() or ice_tx_csum() fail, the error path in\nice_xmit_frame_ring() frees the skb, but the \u0027first\u0027 tx_buf still points\nto it and is marked as valid (ICE_TX_BUF_SKB).\n\u0027next_to_use\u0027 remains unchanged, so the potential problem will\nlikely fix itself when the next packet is transmitted and the tx_buf\ngets overwritten. But if there is no next packet and the interface is\nbrought down instead, ice_clean_tx_ring() -\u003e ice_unmap_and_free_tx_buf()\nwill find the tx_buf and free the skb for the second time.\n\nThe fix is to reset the tx_buf type to ICE_TX_BUF_EMPTY in the error\npath, so that ice_unmap_and_free_tx_buf().\nMove the initialization of \u0027first\u0027 up, to ensure it\u0027s already valid in\ncase we hit the linearization error path.\n\nThe bug was spotted by AI while I had it looking for something else.\nIt also proposed an initial version of the patch.\n\nI reproduced the bug and tested the fix by adding code to inject\nfailures, on a build with KASAN.\n\nI looked for similar bugs in related Intel drivers and did not find any.",
"id": "GHSA-67p5-53x6-9j7q",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:42Z",
"published": "2026-06-24T18:32:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53009"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42919"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:54246"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:54247"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:65711"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:65712"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53009"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492390"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a303baa715e6b78d6a406aaf335f87ff35acfcd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/359906450690a1d70545220bde82ba74f3fd80f8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c08fc2119ef0281cfa2cee007acf0a251be55f2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/910e498613d5bf4cbe5f298c2613666c38679fab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa30e355ee951e804cbc9ff3d5de429ec850eccb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb6cf492ae991e40e1e5b2d3f32ec06e9cc678db"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-53009.json"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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