GHSA-674R-G85V-JFF6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cma: Fix WARNING in res_to_rt
syzbot reported a WARN_ON(!res->dev) in res_to_rt() triggered via addr_handler() during asynchronous address resolution:
" WARNING: drivers/infiniband/core/restrack.c:138 at res_to_rt+0x1c4/0x230 CPU#1: kworker/u8:4/59 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 59 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026 Workqueue: ib_addr process_one_req RIP: 0010:res_to_rt+0x1c4/0x230 drivers/infiniband/core/restrack.c:138 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000201f850 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff88d00ce5 RBX: ffff88807f0fd4f8 RCX: ffff88801e6e0000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8fd996f0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88801e6e0000 R09: 000000000000000a R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: 1ffff1100fe1fa9f R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888125012000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00001d559c3d2000 CR3: 0000000077c4c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: rdma_restrack_add+0x5a/0x8a0 drivers/infiniband/core/restrack.c:236 addr_handler+0x41a/0x5a0 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:3534 process_one_req+0x2eb/0x540 drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c:624 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3375 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xc4e/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:3458 worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3539 kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 "
In addr_handler(), cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip() is called to populate id_priv->cma_dev and bind the associated ib_device to id_priv->id.device. If cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip() returns an error (non-zero status), the ID remains unassociated with any RDMA device.
Previously, rdma_restrack_add(&id_priv->res) was invoked unconditionally even when cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip() failed, passing a resource with a NULL dev pointer and triggering the WARN_ON assertion in res_to_rt().
Fix this by only adding the resource to restrack when acquiring the device succeeds.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90218"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:17Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/cma: Fix WARNING in res_to_rt\n\nsyzbot reported a WARN_ON(!res-\u003edev) in res_to_rt() triggered via\naddr_handler() during asynchronous address resolution:\n\n\"\nWARNING: drivers/infiniband/core/restrack.c:138 at res_to_rt+0x1c4/0x230\nCPU#1: kworker/u8:4/59\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 59 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)\nHardware name: Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026\nWorkqueue: ib_addr process_one_req\nRIP: 0010:res_to_rt+0x1c4/0x230 drivers/infiniband/core/restrack.c:138\nRSP: 0018:ffffc9000201f850 EFLAGS: 00010293\nRAX: ffffffff88d00ce5 RBX: ffff88807f0fd4f8 RCX: ffff88801e6e0000\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8fd996f0 RDI: 0000000000000003\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88801e6e0000 R09: 000000000000000a\nR10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000\nR13: 1ffff1100fe1fa9f R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003\nFS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888125012000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00001d559c3d2000 CR3: 0000000077c4c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n rdma_restrack_add+0x5a/0x8a0 drivers/infiniband/core/restrack.c:236\n addr_handler+0x41a/0x5a0 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:3534\n process_one_req+0x2eb/0x540 drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c:624\n process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3375 [inline]\n process_scheduled_works+0xc4e/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:3458\n worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3539\n kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436\n ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\"\n\nIn addr_handler(), cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip() is called to populate\nid_priv-\u003ecma_dev and bind the associated ib_device to id_priv-\u003eid.device.\nIf cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip() returns an error (non-zero status), the ID\nremains unassociated with any RDMA device.\n\nPreviously, rdma_restrack_add(\u0026id_priv-\u003eres) was invoked unconditionally\neven when cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip() failed, passing a resource with a\nNULL dev pointer and triggering the WARN_ON assertion in res_to_rt().\n\nFix this by only adding the resource to restrack when acquiring the device\nsucceeds.",
"id": "GHSA-674r-g85v-jff6",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:31:56Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:31:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90218"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d7e55ea64dd15769318ba2e0fe0956db82ba3c3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a63cb9ea862ac7d947952b497eef6520853538c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39e83bb77fc92344cd62a373b311f096d812e548"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/544e40805dbb6cfe64916bd4c8b238fec585ac2a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/64a2bd4cfc16c24f0a0e6321a2fd00ffde3e0a5b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c80273d663959504957606b9a24fe901ee2a4a1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6d1ec4fbe56492bb88987d577f04a5fb6955f26"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f72957e0b31f2962f4c1089a9223f1206aa26983"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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