GHSA-66P3-RGG9-52HR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-24 15:30 – Updated: 2026-08-04 12:34In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: use work to update rate to avoid RCU warning
The ieee80211_ops::sta_rc_update must be atomic, because ieee80211_chan_bw_change() holds rcu_read lock while calling drv_sta_rc_update(), so create a work to do original things.
Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section! WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 4621 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:318 rcu_note_context_switch+0x571/0x5d0 CPU: 0 PID: 4621 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Tainted: G W OE Workqueue: phy3 ieee80211_chswitch_work [mac80211] RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x571/0x5d0 Call Trace: __schedule+0xb0/0x1460 ? __mod_timer+0x116/0x360 schedule+0x5a/0xc0 schedule_timeout+0x87/0x150 ? trace_raw_output_tick_stop+0x60/0x60 wait_for_completion_timeout+0x7b/0x140 usb_start_wait_urb+0x82/0x160 [usbcore usb_control_msg+0xe3/0x140 [usbcore rtw_usb_read+0x88/0xe0 [rtw_usb rtw_usb_read8+0xf/0x10 [rtw_usb rtw_fw_send_h2c_command+0xa0/0x170 [rtw_core rtw_fw_send_ra_info+0xc9/0xf0 [rtw_core drv_sta_rc_update+0x7c/0x160 [mac80211 ieee80211_chan_bw_change+0xfb/0x110 [mac80211 ieee80211_change_chanctx+0x38/0x130 [mac80211 ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_switch+0x34e/0x900 [mac80211 ieee80211_link_use_reserved_context+0x88/0xe0 [mac80211 ieee80211_chswitch_work+0x95/0x170 [mac80211 process_one_work+0x201/0x410 worker_thread+0x4a/0x3b0 ? process_one_work+0x410/0x410 kthread+0xe1/0x110 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-54071"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-24T13:16:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: rtw88: use work to update rate to avoid RCU warning\n\nThe ieee80211_ops::sta_rc_update must be atomic, because\nieee80211_chan_bw_change() holds rcu_read lock while calling\ndrv_sta_rc_update(), so create a work to do original things.\n\n Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section!\n WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 4621 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:318\n rcu_note_context_switch+0x571/0x5d0\n CPU: 0 PID: 4621 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Tainted: G W OE\n Workqueue: phy3 ieee80211_chswitch_work [mac80211]\n RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x571/0x5d0\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n __schedule+0xb0/0x1460\n ? __mod_timer+0x116/0x360\n schedule+0x5a/0xc0\n schedule_timeout+0x87/0x150\n ? trace_raw_output_tick_stop+0x60/0x60\n wait_for_completion_timeout+0x7b/0x140\n usb_start_wait_urb+0x82/0x160 [usbcore\n usb_control_msg+0xe3/0x140 [usbcore\n rtw_usb_read+0x88/0xe0 [rtw_usb\n rtw_usb_read8+0xf/0x10 [rtw_usb\n rtw_fw_send_h2c_command+0xa0/0x170 [rtw_core\n rtw_fw_send_ra_info+0xc9/0xf0 [rtw_core\n drv_sta_rc_update+0x7c/0x160 [mac80211\n ieee80211_chan_bw_change+0xfb/0x110 [mac80211\n ieee80211_change_chanctx+0x38/0x130 [mac80211\n ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_switch+0x34e/0x900 [mac80211\n ieee80211_link_use_reserved_context+0x88/0xe0 [mac80211\n ieee80211_chswitch_work+0x95/0x170 [mac80211\n process_one_work+0x201/0x410\n worker_thread+0x4a/0x3b0\n ? process_one_work+0x410/0x410\n kthread+0xe1/0x110\n ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20\n ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30\n \u003c/TASK\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-66p3-rgg9-52hr",
"modified": "2026-08-04T12:34:44Z",
"published": "2025-12-24T15:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-54071"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/107677a8f43521e33e4a653e50fdf55ba622a4ce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bcafcb959a57a6890e900199690c5fc47da1a304"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd3af22323e79a2ffabed366db20aab83716fe6f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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