GHSA-66MM-3GMH-Q6V8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix heap OOB read on empty password write
validate_password_input() computes length = strlen(buf) and then checks buf[length - 1] to strip a trailing newline, without checking that length is nonzero first. Writing an empty string (a bare '\n') to current_password or new_password gives length == 0, and buf[length - 1] reads buf[-1], one byte before the heap allocation holding the copied input.
KASAN confirms this directly:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in store_password_instance.constprop.0+0x223/0x2a0 [hp_bioscfg] Read of size 1 at addr ffff88811bd8da9f by task sh/13740 ... store_password_instance.constprop.0+0x223/0x2a0 [hp_bioscfg] current_password_store+0x14/0x20 [hp_bioscfg] ... The buggy address is located 23 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte region [ffff88811bd8da80, ffff88811bd8da88)
Reproduced identically via new_password_store. Execution continues past the bad read (the garbage byte only affects whether "length" is decremented by one), so the write completes and returns success; this is a pure information read past the buffer, not a crash, but it is still an out-of-bounds access KASAN correctly flags.
Fix by only checking buf[length - 1] when length is nonzero.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81013"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:10Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nplatform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix heap OOB read on empty password write\n\nvalidate_password_input() computes length = strlen(buf) and then\nchecks buf[length - 1] to strip a trailing newline, without checking\nthat length is nonzero first. Writing an empty string (a bare \u0027\\n\u0027)\nto current_password or new_password gives length == 0, and\nbuf[length - 1] reads buf[-1], one byte before the heap allocation\nholding the copied input.\n\nKASAN confirms this directly:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in store_password_instance.constprop.0+0x223/0x2a0 [hp_bioscfg]\n Read of size 1 at addr ffff88811bd8da9f by task sh/13740\n ...\n store_password_instance.constprop.0+0x223/0x2a0 [hp_bioscfg]\n current_password_store+0x14/0x20 [hp_bioscfg]\n ...\n The buggy address is located 23 bytes to the right of\n allocated 8-byte region [ffff88811bd8da80, ffff88811bd8da88)\n\nReproduced identically via new_password_store. Execution continues\npast the bad read (the garbage byte only affects whether \"length\" is\ndecremented by one), so the write completes and returns success; this\nis a pure information read past the buffer, not a crash, but it is\nstill an out-of-bounds access KASAN correctly flags.\n\nFix by only checking buf[length - 1] when length is nonzero.",
"id": "GHSA-66mm-3gmh-q6v8",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:23Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f9aad08424882dd5714b53d29ae044060890752"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21243c15e1d31f0df1517435e3a7784747f19043"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b2ec354f905c14e3270e8ec3ab50f7d8ad73bab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b699e5c1f63a9e79946c35598c8a6f7af2c356b8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cecb8154bd5fa6c8ddbd1a4e8216bbc0f0eb9828"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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