GHSA-66H5-CRGQ-784H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
null_blk: serialize configfs attribute stores with the lock
The NULLB_DEVICE_ATTR _store takes no lock: apply_fn attributes (submit_queues, poll_queues) get dev->NAME written again after apply_fn returns, outside its lock; APPLY=NULL attributes are entirely lockless. configfs only serializes stores per-open-file, so concurrent stores on separate fds race.
For apply_fn attributes, once one store's apply_fn has reconfigured the hardware, a second (losing) store can still overwrite dev->NAME afterwards. This leaves dev->submit_queues out of sync with the live queue count, which is later caught by the WARN_ON_ONCE() in null_map_queues().
For !apply_fn attributes, power_store()'s null_add_dev() validates and builds the device under "lock" but only sets CONFIGURED afterwards. A store slipping in during this window can change a field mid-setup -- for example, zone_nr_conv can be pushed above nr_zones after it has already been clamped, leading to an out-of-bounds dev->zones[] access.
Take "lock" in the macro around the apply_fn call, the CONFIGURED test and the field write, and move it out of nullb_apply_submit_queues()/ nullb_apply_poll_queues() so both paths are covered once. This serializes stores with power_store's setup and with each other.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90185"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:12Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnull_blk: serialize configfs attribute stores with the lock\n\nThe NULLB_DEVICE_ATTR _store takes no lock: apply_fn attributes\n(submit_queues, poll_queues) get dev-\u003eNAME written again after apply_fn\nreturns, outside its lock; APPLY=NULL attributes are entirely lockless.\nconfigfs only serializes stores per-open-file, so concurrent stores on\nseparate fds race.\n\nFor apply_fn attributes, once one store\u0027s apply_fn has reconfigured the\nhardware, a second (losing) store can still overwrite dev-\u003eNAME\nafterwards. This leaves dev-\u003esubmit_queues out of sync with the live\nqueue count, which is later caught by the WARN_ON_ONCE() in\nnull_map_queues().\n\nFor !apply_fn attributes, power_store()\u0027s null_add_dev() validates and\nbuilds the device under \"lock\" but only sets CONFIGURED afterwards. A store\nslipping in during this window can change a field mid-setup -- for example,\nzone_nr_conv can be pushed above nr_zones after it has already been\nclamped, leading to an out-of-bounds dev-\u003ezones[] access.\n\nTake \"lock\" in the macro around the apply_fn call, the CONFIGURED test and\nthe field write, and move it out of nullb_apply_submit_queues()/\nnullb_apply_poll_queues() so both paths are covered once. This serializes\nstores with power_store\u0027s setup and with each other.",
"id": "GHSA-66h5-crgq-784h",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3945ce8cbce4e328e6fdf0b522dc71e340de19db"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65cae82fd3c39b53430672cb9e3ecd267471a6ce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e7fff51808237703a3a1df6dd5cae1dfd1db86d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88d806d0e1d36246208386a8e55b511c1b3d647c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e839ed5210399a0330a8a6c5885c1d40a537c6d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c70994c2862b05e44728912b2ea9487d31e2aea7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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