GHSA-6552-7G22-4QF3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-28 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rds: fix uninitialized trans dereference in CM event handler
rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() assigns trans only when the RDMA device is an InfiniBand CA (RDMA_NODE_IB_CA). On any other device type, e.g. an iWARP RNIC such as siw, trans stays uninitialized, but the event switch dereferences it: unconditionally in the RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST case via trans->cm_handle_connect(), and (with a connection context) in the ROUTE_RESOLVED and ESTABLISHED cases.
An RDS listener on an iWARP device therefore crashes the kernel as soon as a connect request arrives: with CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO the wild load becomes a NULL dereference at offset 0xa0 (&trans->cm_handle_connect) in the iw_cm_wq workqueue.
GCC masks the bug in default builds by folding the uninitialized load into &rds_ib_transport; Clang-built kernels take the real uninitialized path and oops.
The active side can land on a non-IB device too: the id that rds_ib_conn_path_connect() creates is not restricted to a node type, so rdma_resolve_addr() binds it to whichever device serves the local address, and an iWARP RNIC on the same netdev qualifies. The crash there is different: resolving a route on an iWARP id never fills in cm_id->route.path_rec, and the ROUTE_RESOLVED case writes path_rec[0].sl before it calls into the transport.
The iWARP transport was dropped long ago and IB is the only transport left, so make that explicit: initialize trans to &rds_ib_transport at declaration, drop the conditional assignment, reject a connect request that arrives on a non-IB device, and drop a connection whose address resolved to one instead of resolving a route on it. The rejection is limited to RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST on purpose: a non-zero return from the handler makes rdma_cm destroy the id the event was delivered on, which is right for the request's freshly created id but would free a connection id that RDS still owns for any other event. On the active side the id stays ic->i_cm_id and the connection's shutdown destroys it, so that case returns 0.
[achender: reject only on RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST instead of bailing out for every event on a non-IB device, so that rdma_cm does not destroy connection ids RDS still tracks; drop a connection whose address resolved to a non-IB device before a route is resolved on it; changelog adjusted]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99166"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T11:17:37Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: rds: fix uninitialized trans dereference in CM event handler\n\nrds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() assigns trans only when the RDMA\ndevice is an InfiniBand CA (RDMA_NODE_IB_CA). On any other device\ntype, e.g. an iWARP RNIC such as siw, trans stays uninitialized, but\nthe event switch dereferences it: unconditionally in the\nRDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST case via trans-\u003ecm_handle_connect(),\nand (with a connection context) in the ROUTE_RESOLVED and\nESTABLISHED cases.\n\nAn RDS listener on an iWARP device therefore crashes the kernel as\nsoon as a connect request arrives: with CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO\nthe wild load becomes a NULL dereference at offset 0xa0\n(\u0026trans-\u003ecm_handle_connect) in the iw_cm_wq workqueue.\n\nGCC masks the bug in default builds by folding the uninitialized\nload into \u0026rds_ib_transport; Clang-built kernels take the real\nuninitialized path and oops.\n\nThe active side can land on a non-IB device too: the id that\nrds_ib_conn_path_connect() creates is not restricted to a node type,\nso rdma_resolve_addr() binds it to whichever device serves the local\naddress, and an iWARP RNIC on the same netdev qualifies. The crash\nthere is different: resolving a route on an iWARP id never fills in\ncm_id-\u003eroute.path_rec, and the ROUTE_RESOLVED case writes\npath_rec[0].sl before it calls into the transport.\n\nThe iWARP transport was dropped long ago and IB is the only\ntransport left, so make that explicit: initialize trans to\n\u0026rds_ib_transport at declaration, drop the conditional assignment,\nreject a connect request that arrives on a non-IB device, and drop a\nconnection whose address resolved to one instead of resolving a\nroute on it. The rejection is limited to RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST\non purpose: a non-zero return from the handler makes rdma_cm destroy\nthe id the event was delivered on, which is right for the request\u0027s\nfreshly created id but would free a connection id that RDS still owns\nfor any other event. On the active side the id stays ic-\u003ei_cm_id and\nthe connection\u0027s shutdown destroys it, so that case returns 0.\n\n[achender: reject only on RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST instead of\n bailing out for every event on a non-IB device, so that rdma_cm does\n not destroy connection ids RDS still tracks; drop a connection whose\n address resolved to a non-IB device before a route is resolved on it;\n changelog adjusted]",
"id": "GHSA-6552-7g22-4qf3",
"modified": "2026-10-28T12:31:06Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T12:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/492ba6ac1b1ffb8a06ff52db0825c1af2cdb28c8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f23e4e3a31dacfd82a8f56be253adc0910ee84f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca14c289ed9ffed6cc64290d039e923e5720a8bf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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