GHSA-64JX-XH98-9HG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-15 12:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt792x: fix use-after-free in mt76_rx_poll_complete
A use-after-free issue occurs in mt76_rx_poll_complete due to a race condition. The STA has already been removed, but the rx_status still had a pointer to the wcid in the STA.
Set the links' wcid pointers to be NULL for a MLD in mt7925_sta_pre_rcu_remove()
BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in mt76_rx_poll_complete+0x280/0x470 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xec/0x128 show_stack+0x18/0x28 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xc8 print_report+0x1b8/0x710 kasan_report+0xe0/0x144 do_bad_area+0x120/0x260 do_tag_check_fault+0x20/0x34 do_mem_abort+0x54/0xa8 el1_abort+0x3c/0x5c el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0xcc el1h_64_sync+0x7c/0x80 mt76_rx_poll_complete+0x280/0x470 mt76_dma_rx_poll+0x114/0x51c mt792x_poll_rx+0x60/0xf8 napi_threaded_poll_loop+0xe0/0x450 napi_threaded_poll+0x80/0x9c kthread+0x11c/0x158 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90380"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mt76: mt792x: fix use-after-free in mt76_rx_poll_complete\n\nA use-after-free issue occurs in mt76_rx_poll_complete due to a race\ncondition. The STA has already been removed, but the rx_status still\nhad a pointer to the wcid in the STA.\n\nSet the links\u0027 wcid pointers to be NULL for a MLD in\nmt7925_sta_pre_rcu_remove()\n\nBUG: KASAN: invalid-access in mt76_rx_poll_complete+0x280/0x470\nCall trace:\ndump_backtrace+0xec/0x128\nshow_stack+0x18/0x28\ndump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xc8\nprint_report+0x1b8/0x710\nkasan_report+0xe0/0x144\ndo_bad_area+0x120/0x260\ndo_tag_check_fault+0x20/0x34\ndo_mem_abort+0x54/0xa8\nel1_abort+0x3c/0x5c\nel1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0xcc\nel1h_64_sync+0x7c/0x80\nmt76_rx_poll_complete+0x280/0x470\nmt76_dma_rx_poll+0x114/0x51c\nmt792x_poll_rx+0x60/0xf8\nnapi_threaded_poll_loop+0xe0/0x450\nnapi_threaded_poll+0x80/0x9c\nkthread+0x11c/0x158\nret_from_fork+0x10/0x20",
"id": "GHSA-64jx-xh98-9hg9",
"modified": "2026-10-15T12:30:50Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90380"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/217f9e7bb02558759be9d9ecfe532e9708741c50"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2aa3d3b9fac9163e9226e35556607ae3f75be21e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aaf414bf81ab4b680580871784b0b929818188eb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b250943f3f8351385a17972bda001664a5c51008"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.