{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.70.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@grackle-ai/mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.70.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T17:23:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` MCP tools are included in `SCOPED_TOOLS` (visible to scoped agents) but their handlers do not receive `authContext` and do not enforce workspace scoping. A scoped agent in Workspace A can supply an arbitrary `workspaceId` parameter to search or retrieve knowledge graph nodes from Workspace B, bypassing workspace isolation boundaries.\n\nThis is a **cross-workspace data leakage** vulnerability affecting any deployment where multiple workspaces contain sensitive knowledge graph data and scoped agents are used.\n\n**Affected code:**\n- `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:146-169` (knowledge_search handler)\n- `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:244-283` (knowledge_get_node handler)\n- `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts:11` (both tools listed in SCOPED_TOOLS)\n\n**Contrast with correct implementation:** `knowledge_create_node` (same file, lines 334-357) properly receives `authContext` and overrides the user-supplied `workspaceId` for scoped callers.\n\n### Design Note\n\nCross-workspace knowledge sharing is a legitimate future feature \u2014 agents working across different repos may need to collaborate and share knowledge. However, this access should be **opt-in with explicit grants**, not an implicit bypass. The immediate fix locks scoped agents to their own workspace. A future design could introduce:\n- Workspace-level \"share knowledge with\" settings\n- A `cross_workspace` scope on scoped tokens\n- Explicit `workspaceIds` (plural) in the auth context\n\n### Patches\n\n**Fix:** Add `authContext` parameter to `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` handlers and enforce workspace scoping, matching the pattern in `knowledge_create_node`:\n```typescript\nconst resolvedWorkspaceId =\n  authContext?.type === \"scoped\"\n    ? authContext.workspaceId ?? \"\"\n    : workspaceId ?? \"\";\n```\n\nWhen cross-workspace collaboration is designed, this check can be relaxed intentionally with proper access controls.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not use scoped agent tokens in multi-workspace deployments until patched. Alternatively, remove `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` from the `SCOPED_TOOLS` set in `tool-scoping.ts`.\n\n### References\n\n- CWE-284: Improper Access Control\n- File: `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts`\n- File: `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts`",
  "id": "GHSA-647h-p824-99w7",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T17:23:11Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T17:23:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle/security/advisories/GHSA-647h-p824-99w7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@grackle-ai/mcp has a workspace authorization bypass in its knowledge_search MCP tool"
}