GHSA-62M5-M548-5V5F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:36In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL
A deferred byte-range lock (an SMB2_LOCK that blocks) registers an async work on conn->async_requests via setup_async_work(), with cancel_fn = smb2_remove_blocked_lock and cancel_argv[0] pointing at the struct file_lock.
When the request is cancelled, the worker frees the file_lock with locks_free_lock() and takes the cancelled early-exit, which "goto out"s and never reaches release_async_work() -- the only site that unlinks the work from conn->async_requests and clears cancel_fn/cancel_argv. The work therefore stays matchable on async_requests with a live cancel_fn pointing at the freed file_lock, until connection teardown finally runs release_async_work().
smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn unconditionally with no state guard, so a second SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId, arriving in that window, re-runs smb2_remove_blocked_lock() on the freed file_lock -- a slab use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block __locks_delete_block locks_delete_block ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock smb2_remove_blocked_lock smb2_cancel <- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn handle_ksmbd_work Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock <- smb2_lock Freed by ...: locks_free_lock <- smb2_lock (cancelled branch) ... cache file_lock_cache of size 192
Reproduced on mainline with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client.
Skip a work whose state is already KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED so its cancel callback cannot be fired a second time.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53198"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL\n\nA deferred byte-range lock (an SMB2_LOCK that blocks) registers an async work on\nconn-\u003easync_requests via setup_async_work(), with cancel_fn =\nsmb2_remove_blocked_lock and cancel_argv[0] pointing at the struct file_lock.\n\nWhen the request is cancelled, the worker frees the file_lock with\nlocks_free_lock() and takes the cancelled early-exit, which \"goto out\"s and never\nreaches release_async_work() -- the only site that unlinks the work from\nconn-\u003easync_requests and clears cancel_fn/cancel_argv. The work therefore stays\nmatchable on async_requests with a live cancel_fn pointing at the freed file_lock,\nuntil connection teardown finally runs release_async_work().\n\nsmb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn unconditionally with no state guard, so a second\nSMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId, arriving in that window, re-runs\nsmb2_remove_blocked_lock() on the freed file_lock -- a slab use-after-free:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block\n __locks_delete_block\n locks_delete_block\n ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock\n smb2_remove_blocked_lock\n smb2_cancel \u003c- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn\n handle_ksmbd_work\n Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock \u003c- smb2_lock\n Freed by ...: locks_free_lock \u003c- smb2_lock (cancelled branch)\n ... cache file_lock_cache of size 192\n\nReproduced on mainline with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client.\n\nSkip a work whose state is already KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED so its cancel callback\ncannot be fired a second time.",
"id": "GHSA-62m5-m548-5v5f",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:36:15Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T09:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53198"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0da2e073f9cbf4985a0fd9acb71bc5ff599f8afd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14d2eee0193ac3cd1bf3d014373449f0b8d35d6d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b2eda2821cff1d1b5a423b6ee7d8fc6fbc8e694"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89ae9df09d2c1fb4a4eb495c113a7ce1dca34147"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7063c7426ea5a4d15e01b60538718765392f49d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f580d27e8928828693df44ba2db0fffdbe11dfea"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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