GHSA-62J3-36WR-4GW5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-18 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-12 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/ASPM: Disable ASPM on MFD function removal to avoid use-after-free
Struct pcie_link_state->downstream is a pointer to the pci_dev of function 0. Previously we retained that pointer when removing function 0, and subsequent ASPM policy changes dereferenced it, resulting in a use-after-free warning from KASAN, e.g.:
# echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:03:00.0/remove # echo powersave > /sys/module/pcie_aspm/parameters/policy
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pcie_config_aspm_link+0x42d/0x500 Call Trace: kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 pcie_config_aspm_link+0x42d/0x500 pcie_aspm_set_policy+0x8e/0x1a0 param_attr_store+0x162/0x2c0 module_attr_store+0x3e/0x80
PCIe spec r6.0, sec 7.5.3.7, recommends that software program the same ASPM Control value in all functions of multi-function devices.
Disable ASPM and free the pcie_link_state when any child function is removed so we can discard the dangling pcie_link_state->downstream pointer and maintain the same ASPM Control configuration for all functions.
[bhelgaas: commit log and comment]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-53446"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-18T16:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nPCI/ASPM: Disable ASPM on MFD function removal to avoid use-after-free\n\nStruct pcie_link_state-\u003edownstream is a pointer to the pci_dev of function\n0. Previously we retained that pointer when removing function 0, and\nsubsequent ASPM policy changes dereferenced it, resulting in a\nuse-after-free warning from KASAN, e.g.:\n\n # echo 1 \u003e /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:03:00.0/remove\n # echo powersave \u003e /sys/module/pcie_aspm/parameters/policy\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pcie_config_aspm_link+0x42d/0x500\n Call Trace:\n kasan_report+0xae/0xe0\n pcie_config_aspm_link+0x42d/0x500\n pcie_aspm_set_policy+0x8e/0x1a0\n param_attr_store+0x162/0x2c0\n module_attr_store+0x3e/0x80\n\nPCIe spec r6.0, sec 7.5.3.7, recommends that software program the same ASPM\nControl value in all functions of multi-function devices.\n\nDisable ASPM and free the pcie_link_state when any child function is\nremoved so we can discard the dangling pcie_link_state-\u003edownstream pointer\nand maintain the same ASPM Control configuration for all functions.\n\n[bhelgaas: commit log and comment]",
"id": "GHSA-62j3-36wr-4gw5",
"modified": "2025-12-12T21:31:32Z",
"published": "2025-09-18T18:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53446"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4203722d51afe3d239e03f15cc73efdf023a7103"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/456d8aa37d0f56fc9e985e812496e861dcd6f2f2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/666e7f9d60cee23077ea3e6331f6f8a19f7ea03f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7aecdd47910c51707696e8b0e045b9f88bd4230f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7badf4d6f49a358a01ab072bbff88d3ee886c33b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9856c0de49052174ab474113f4ba40c02aaee086"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d51d2eeae4ce54d542909c4d9d07bf371a78592c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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