GHSA-62FV-XJ62-4R9Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-23 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: close a re-opened queue timer in the destructor
queue_delete() closes the queue timer, then frees it. snd_seq_timer_close() clears q->timer->timeri. snd_use_lock_sync() then drains borrowers, and snd_seq_timer_delete() frees q->timer.
A borrower can re-open the timer inside that window. A SET_QUEUE_CLIENT that took a queueptr() use_lock reference before the queue was unlinked runs snd_seq_timer_open() after the close. Open refuses re-open only while timeri is set, and the close just cleared it, so it re-opens timeri.
snd_seq_timer_delete() does not close that instance. Its snd_seq_timer_stop() is a no-op, because running was cleared first. So it frees q->timer with the instance still live. The queue is freed next.
The instance stays on the global timer with callback_data pointing at the freed queue. A non-owner START on the unlocked queue arms it. The next tick derefs the freed queue in snd_seq_timer_interrupt().
Reachable by an unprivileged user with access to /dev/snd/seq. No CAP and no queue ownership required.
Close any lingering instance in the destructor. There, ->timeri can no longer change: the queue is unlinked and all use_lock borrowers have drained, so no snd_seq_queue_use() can re-open it. Close it before clearing q->timer. snd_timer_close() waits for any in-flight snd_seq_timer_interrupt() to finish, and that callback still reads q->timer (via snd_seq_check_queue()), so q->timer must stay valid until it drains.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68202"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: seq: close a re-opened queue timer in the destructor\n\nqueue_delete() closes the queue timer, then frees it. snd_seq_timer_close()\nclears q-\u003etimer-\u003etimeri. snd_use_lock_sync() then drains borrowers, and\nsnd_seq_timer_delete() frees q-\u003etimer.\n\nA borrower can re-open the timer inside that window. A SET_QUEUE_CLIENT\nthat took a queueptr() use_lock reference before the queue was unlinked\nruns snd_seq_timer_open() after the close. Open refuses re-open only while\ntimeri is set, and the close just cleared it, so it re-opens timeri.\n\nsnd_seq_timer_delete() does not close that instance. Its snd_seq_timer_stop()\nis a no-op, because running was cleared first. So it frees q-\u003etimer with the\ninstance still live. The queue is freed next.\n\nThe instance stays on the global timer with callback_data pointing at the\nfreed queue. A non-owner START on the unlocked queue arms it. The next tick\nderefs the freed queue in snd_seq_timer_interrupt().\n\nReachable by an unprivileged user with access to /dev/snd/seq. No CAP and\nno queue ownership required.\n\nClose any lingering instance in the destructor. There, -\u003etimeri can no\nlonger change: the queue is unlinked and all use_lock borrowers have\ndrained, so no snd_seq_queue_use() can re-open it. Close it before clearing\nq-\u003etimer. snd_timer_close() waits for any in-flight snd_seq_timer_interrupt()\nto finish, and that callback still reads q-\u003etimer (via snd_seq_check_queue()),\nso q-\u003etimer must stay valid until it drains.",
"id": "GHSA-62fv-xj62-4r9q",
"modified": "2026-08-23T15:32:57Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68202"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24f0cabf173539f048946c8fc221131dc221f277"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c4dc0ed50b05cd847a4b34b8cebf0775f19aeb9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31a6163e301d832060f8236f1ed17cbc1ca198df"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a10025c7fd09a7d2af37a3ae1da188569fce470"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7478ef94b49bc9789cf1a003deec58b42283dde4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d9be6fc30f384f92c4e1b8ed40bd9d4796b7833"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7feeaca1f53b10df9b4de9eaf611767ca70dc92"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb40d03ed792a8a8bf77aa0ee15df57b0ff78b07"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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