GHSA-62C9-4G59-6RJ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard filler with a keyed sector marker
The discard-block check in dm_integrity_rw_tag() treats a stored tag of all 0xf6 bytes (DISCARD_FILLER) as proof a block was discarded and skips HMAC verification. allow_discards is only accepted in dm-integrity's standalone mode. An attacker with raw write access to the backing device, but without the integrity key, can stamp any block with an all-0xf6 tag and have it served as authentic.
Add a new "allow_discards_keyed" target argument that marks discarded blocks with a keyed checksum of (salt || sector) instead, computed by integrity_discard_checksum().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90333"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:31Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndm-integrity: replace forgeable discard filler with a keyed sector marker\n\nThe discard-block check in dm_integrity_rw_tag() treats a stored tag\nof all 0xf6 bytes (DISCARD_FILLER) as proof a block was discarded and\nskips HMAC verification. allow_discards is only accepted in\ndm-integrity\u0027s standalone mode. An attacker with raw write access to\nthe backing device, but without the integrity key, can stamp any block\nwith an all-0xf6 tag and have it served as authentic.\n\nAdd a new \"allow_discards_keyed\" target argument that marks discarded\nblocks with a keyed checksum of (salt || sector) instead, computed by\nintegrity_discard_checksum().",
"id": "GHSA-62c9-4g59-6rj6",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:01Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90333"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c58ea19a909ef6bed4f0f824e9cd7e30d7e4775"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6228722c27304e4682cddc1fede03898f87e4414"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68c5c42567bc462139128968ebbfadd0aefff519"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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