GHSA-622H-H2P8-743X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-06 20:43 – Updated: 2024-10-16 17:05Impact
A user can reverse engineer the JWT token (JSON Web Token) used in authentication for Manager and API access, forging a valid NeuVector Token to perform malicious activity in NeuVector. This can lead to an RCE.
Patches
Upgrade to NeuVector version 5.2.2 or later and latest Helm chart (2.6.3+). + In 5.2.2 the certificate for JWT-signing is created automatically by controller with validity of 90days and rotated automatically. + Use Helm-based deployment/upgrade to 5.2.2 to generate a unique certificate for Manager, REST API, ahd registry adapter. Helm based installation/upgrade is required in order to automatically generate certificates upon initial installation and each subsequent upgrade. + See release notes for manual/yaml based deployment advice. + 5.2.2 also implements additional protections against possible RCE for the feature of custom compliance scripts.
Workarounds
Users can replace the Manager & Controller certificate manually by following the instructions in documented here. However, upgrading to 5.2.2 and replacing Manager/REST API certificate is recommended to provide additional security enhancements to prevent possible attempted exploit and resulting RCE. See release notes for additional details.
Credits
Thank you to Dejan Zelic at Offensive Security for responsibly reporting this vulnerability.
For More Information
View the NeuVector Security Policy
General NeuVector documentation
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 0.0.0-20230930010431-57d107118e92"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/neuvector/neuvector"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20231003121714-be746957ee7c"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-32188"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1270"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-06T20:43:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-16T09:15:03Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact \n\nA user can reverse engineer the JWT token (JSON Web Token) used in authentication for Manager and API access, forging a valid NeuVector Token to perform malicious activity in NeuVector. This can lead to an RCE. \n\n### Patches \n\nUpgrade to NeuVector [version 5.2.2](https://open-docs.neuvector.com/releasenotes/5x) or later and latest Helm chart (2.6.3+). \n+ In 5.2.2 the certificate for JWT-signing is created automatically by controller with validity of 90days and rotated automatically.\n+ Use Helm-based deployment/upgrade to 5.2.2 to generate a unique certificate for Manager, REST API, ahd registry adapter. Helm based installation/upgrade is required in order to automatically generate certificates upon initial installation and each subsequent upgrade. \n+ See [release notes](https://open-docs.neuvector.com/releasenotes/5x) for manual/yaml based deployment advice.\n+ 5.2.2 also implements additional protections against possible RCE for the feature of custom compliance scripts. \n\n### Workarounds \n\nUsers can replace the Manager \u0026 Controller certificate manually by following the instructions in documented [here](https://open-docs.neuvector.com/configuration/console/replacecert). However, upgrading to 5.2.2 and replacing Manager/REST API certificate is recommended to provide additional security enhancements to prevent possible attempted exploit and resulting RCE. See [release notes](https://open-docs.neuvector.com/releasenotes/5x) for additional details.\n\n### Credits \n\nThank you to [Dejan Zelic](https://dejandayoff.com/) at [Offensive Security](https://www.offsec.com/) for responsibly reporting this vulnerability. \n\n### For More Information \n\nView the NeuVector [Security Policy](https://github.com/neuvector/neuvector/security) \n\nGeneral NeuVector [documentation](https://open-docs.neuvector.com/) ",
"id": "GHSA-622h-h2p8-743x",
"modified": "2024-10-16T17:05:17Z",
"published": "2023-10-06T20:43:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/neuvector/neuvector/security/advisories/GHSA-622h-h2p8-743x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32188"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2023-32188"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/neuvector/neuvector"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://open-docs.neuvector.com/releasenotes/5x"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "JWT token compromise can allow malicious actions including Remote Code Execution (RCE) "
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.