GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-5XV7-X5QX-3WV4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK

tipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv() subtracts the peer-supplied connection ack count from the unsigned 16-bit send counter snt_unacked without checking that it does not exceed the number of messages actually outstanding:

tsk->snt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);

msg_conn_ack() is read straight from a received CONN_MANAGER/CONN_ACK message. If the ack count is larger than snt_unacked, the subtraction wraps to a near-maximum value, leaving tsk_conn_cong() permanently true and starving the connection of further transmits.

Validate the ACK count at the start of the CONN_ACK block and drop the message if it acknowledges more messages than are outstanding. A peer (or, for a local connection, the connected peer socket) can otherwise wedge a TIPC connection's send side by sending an oversized connection ack.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-74282"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:22:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK\n\ntipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv() subtracts the peer-supplied connection ack count\nfrom the unsigned 16-bit send counter snt_unacked without checking that it\ndoes not exceed the number of messages actually outstanding:\n\n\ttsk-\u003esnt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);\n\nmsg_conn_ack() is read straight from a received CONN_MANAGER/CONN_ACK\nmessage. If the ack count is larger than snt_unacked, the subtraction\nwraps to a near-maximum value, leaving tsk_conn_cong() permanently true\nand starving the connection of further transmits.\n\nValidate the ACK count at the start of the CONN_ACK block and drop the\nmessage if it acknowledges more messages than are outstanding. A peer (or,\nfor a local connection, the connected peer socket) can otherwise wedge a\nTIPC connection\u0027s send side by sending an oversized connection ack.",
  "id": "GHSA-5xv7-x5qx-3wv4",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:35Z",
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:32:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74282"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e2c956745777e6ffdee7f30da5935741c03ee1e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3388145d258cf2c4c98278e3987296007d30672e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3cfa3d8e0dc167850edeb5bf5a07757db83fd54e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47ed873e4ceda34098bd46d8e96b4bb13cad3a04"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67e55b054bf8025658dc0e255057f2a6236416bd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96f91b8ae1a489b3eca137e7acf42cf985fb8939"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab3e10b44ba5411779aac7afd2477917dd77750f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b44bebdd32c9ff66ee2aebfc317ced44bedd9335"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.