GHSA-5WMV-5WG4-7MV5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-25 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: xhci: Fix sleep in atomic context in xhci_free_streams()
When a USB device with active stream endpoints is disconnected, xhci_free_streams() is called from the hub_event workqueue to free the stream resources. It calls xhci_free_stream_info() while holding xhci->lock with irqs disabled.
xhci_free_stream_info() invokes xhci_free_stream_ctx(), which calls dma_free_coherent() for large stream context arrays.
dma_free_coherent() can sleep (e.g. via vunmap), triggering a BUG when called from atomic context.
Call trace: dma_free_attrs+0x174/0x220 xhci_free_stream_info+0xd0/0x11c xhci_free_streams+0x278/0x37c usb_free_streams+0x98/0xc0 usb_unbind_interface+0x1b8/0x2f8 device_release_driver_internal+0x1d4/0x2cc device_release_driver+0x18/0x28 bus_remove_device+0x160/0x1a4 device_del+0x1ec/0x350 usb_disable_device+0x98/0x214 usb_disconnect+0xf0/0x35c hub_event+0xab4/0x19ec process_one_work+0x278/0x63c
Fix this by saving the stream_info pointers and clearing the ep references under the lock, then calling xhci_free_stream_info() outside the lock where sleeping is allowed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64465"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:31Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: xhci: Fix sleep in atomic context in xhci_free_streams()\n\nWhen a USB device with active stream endpoints is disconnected,\nxhci_free_streams() is called from the hub_event workqueue to\nfree the stream resources. It calls xhci_free_stream_info()\nwhile holding xhci-\u003elock with irqs disabled.\n\nxhci_free_stream_info() invokes xhci_free_stream_ctx(), which\ncalls dma_free_coherent() for large stream context arrays.\n\ndma_free_coherent() can sleep (e.g. via vunmap), triggering\na BUG when called from atomic context.\n\nCall trace:\n dma_free_attrs+0x174/0x220\n xhci_free_stream_info+0xd0/0x11c\n xhci_free_streams+0x278/0x37c\n usb_free_streams+0x98/0xc0\n usb_unbind_interface+0x1b8/0x2f8\n device_release_driver_internal+0x1d4/0x2cc\n device_release_driver+0x18/0x28\n bus_remove_device+0x160/0x1a4\n device_del+0x1ec/0x350\n usb_disable_device+0x98/0x214\n usb_disconnect+0xf0/0x35c\n hub_event+0xab4/0x19ec\n process_one_work+0x278/0x63c\n\nFix this by saving the stream_info pointers and clearing the\nep references under the lock, then calling xhci_free_stream_info()\noutside the lock where sleeping is allowed.",
"id": "GHSA-5wmv-5wg4-7mv5",
"modified": "2026-07-25T12:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64465"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10666ac9c552990204e791af653abf8e9d9ff619"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e45aa722c4ce5663e987102aac18c8ad6a83fdd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42c37c4b75d38b51d84f31a8e29427f5e06a7c2a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93cd037da94fcb93183bfb2457e3a56d3eb4c8f4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d107eb316144c5fb958486e7fe604cd7f1b35cda"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e623e4a203f56d5c57519a9a3cb29600551534ad"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7b022ae07685e7526fc39f387ce65b5d309dd3b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f90586129cf9e1fbdb718ef602eea3f15dc1c31c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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