GHSA-5V98-RQ5R-8RXH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-03 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_input: stop callbacks before unregistering input device
virtinput_remove() unregisters the input device before resetting the virtio device. virtinput_recv_events() drops vi->lock around input_event(), so clearing vi->ready does not stop a callback that passed the entry check. It can still use vi->idev, requeue buffers and kick the queue.
Reset first, as virtinput_freeze() already does. With the preceding core change, reset waits for callbacks before input_unregister_device() can free vi->idev. Recheck vi->ready after taking the lock again: keep draining completed events so an input packet is not truncated, but stop requeueing buffers and kicking the queue.
With evdev attached, input_unregister_handle() currently waits for an RCU grace period, which also waits out IRQ callbacks. This masks the lifetime bug on PCI and MMIO, but does not protect sleepable callbacks on other transports.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97986"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:26Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvirtio_input: stop callbacks before unregistering input device\n\nvirtinput_remove() unregisters the input device before resetting the\nvirtio device. virtinput_recv_events() drops vi-\u003elock around input_event(),\nso clearing vi-\u003eready does not stop a callback that passed the entry check.\nIt can still use vi-\u003eidev, requeue buffers and kick the queue.\n\nReset first, as virtinput_freeze() already does. With the preceding core\nchange, reset waits for callbacks before input_unregister_device() can\nfree vi-\u003eidev. Recheck vi-\u003eready after taking the lock again: keep draining\ncompleted events so an input packet is not truncated, but stop requeueing\nbuffers and kicking the queue.\n\nWith evdev attached, input_unregister_handle() currently waits for an RCU\ngrace period, which also waits out IRQ callbacks. This masks the lifetime\nbug on PCI and MMIO, but does not protect sleepable callbacks on other\ntransports.",
"id": "GHSA-5v98-rq5r-8rxh",
"modified": "2026-10-03T12:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97986"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ae729b1f8ab81d1244061872db2fb0ebb110d2a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5378f7945856a5ed88e6f9850bc7a68f54090135"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81073bca2062c916c818f2744fbab545a5c4982b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8226aeee9b9a94cd699fbb51cb230feff46cfaf2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3ba86a270dd87460759214046dc7cbd409ac711"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7808b37da0a619cf1fa541c2384e783fecc2480"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.