GHSA-5RGX-MCQ5-R7WV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 21:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 09:30
VLAI
Details

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in lud oaskit allows reflected cross-site scripting via the default HTML error handler.

Oaskit.ErrorHandler.Default.format_reason/4 and Oaskit.ErrorHandler.Default.reason_to_html/1 in lib/oaskit/error_handler/default.ex render request-validation failures as an HTML page whenever the request's Accept header contains html, interpolating request-controlled strings into that page without HTML escaping. The unescaped values are object keys taken from a request body or from an object or deepObject query parameter, which appear in the JSON Schema error's instance path when a schema rejects them (for example under additionalProperties: false), and the raw Content-Type header, reflected in unsupported-media-type errors when it fails to parse.

Because browsers send Accept: text/html on ordinary top-level navigation, a crafted GET link is sufficient to trigger the error page; no form submission, custom Content-Type, or attacker-controlled script on the victim's side is required. A payload such as filter[alert(document.domain)]=x terminates the enclosing markup and the injected script executes in the origin of the application using oaskit, giving it access to that origin's cookies, session, and same-origin responses.

Both HTML error rendering and the vulnerable handler are enabled by default: Oaskit.Plugs.ValidateRequest defaults :html_errors to true and :error_handler to Oaskit.ErrorHandler.Default, so applications following the documented usage are affected without any opt-in.

This issue affects oaskit: from 0.1.0 before 0.14.1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-66296"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-03T20:17:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in lud oaskit allows reflected cross-site scripting via the default HTML error handler.\n\nOaskit.ErrorHandler.Default.format_reason/4 and Oaskit.ErrorHandler.Default.reason_to_html/1 in lib/oaskit/error_handler/default.ex render request-validation failures as an HTML page whenever the request\u0027s Accept header contains html, interpolating request-controlled strings into that page without HTML escaping. The unescaped values are object keys taken from a request body or from an object or deepObject query parameter, which appear in the JSON Schema error\u0027s instance path when a schema rejects them (for example under additionalProperties: false), and the raw Content-Type header, reflected in unsupported-media-type errors when it fails to parse.\n\nBecause browsers send Accept: text/html on ordinary top-level navigation, a crafted GET link is sufficient to trigger the error page; no form submission, custom Content-Type, or attacker-controlled script on the victim\u0027s side is required. A payload such as filter[\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.domain)\u003c/script\u003e]=x terminates the enclosing markup and the injected script executes in the origin of the application using oaskit, giving it access to that origin\u0027s cookies, session, and same-origin responses.\n\nBoth HTML error rendering and the vulnerable handler are enabled by default: Oaskit.Plugs.ValidateRequest defaults :html_errors to true and :error_handler to Oaskit.ErrorHandler.Default, so applications following the documented usage are affected without any opt-in.\n\nThis issue affects oaskit: from 0.1.0 before 0.14.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-5rgx-mcq5-r7wv",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T09:30:25Z",
  "published": "2026-08-03T21:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lud/oaskit/security/advisories/GHSA-h7xw-x8wr-xpcc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66296"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lud/oaskit/commit/552de8ca0ff60617bea58bcafa451892d61a161c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lud/oaskit/commit/b70c6b2eaf0b11bdd0bbb21b8a87dbb3d46918a1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66296.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66296"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



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