GHSA-5P3M-M55C-XWFG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-19 12:30 – Updated: 2025-09-24 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Skip do PCI error slot reset during RAS recovery
Why: The PCI error slot reset maybe triggered after inject ue to UMC multi times, this caused system hang. [ 557.371857] amdgpu 0000:af:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset succeeded, trying to resume [ 557.373718] [drm] PCIE GART of 512M enabled. [ 557.373722] [drm] PTB located at 0x0000031FED700000 [ 557.373788] [drm] VRAM is lost due to GPU reset! [ 557.373789] [drm] PSP is resuming... [ 557.547012] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_err_detected Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Exit, result = 3, need reset [ 557.547067] [drm] PCI error: detected callback, state(1)!! [ 557.547069] [drm] No support for XGMI hive yet... [ 557.548125] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Enter [ 557.607763] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: wait vital counter value 0x16b5b after 1 iterations [ 557.607777] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 1. Exit, err = 0, result = 5, recovered [ 557.610492] [drm] PCI error: slot reset callback!! ... [ 560.689382] amdgpu 0000:3f:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded! [ 560.689546] amdgpu 0000:5a:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded! [ 560.689562] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x5f080b54534f611f: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 560.701008] CPU: 16 PID: 2361 Comm: kworker/u448:9 Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-91-generic #101-Ubuntu [ 560.712057] Hardware name: Microsoft C278A/C278A, BIOS C2789.5.BS.1C11.AG.1 11/08/2023 [ 560.720959] Workqueue: amdgpu-reset-hive amdgpu_ras_do_recovery [amdgpu] [ 560.728887] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu] [ 560.736891] Code: ff 41 89 c6 e9 1b ff ff ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 4f ff ff ff be 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 76 c9 8b ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 3c fd ff ff <48> 83 ba 18 02 00 00 00 0f 84 6a f8 ff ff 48 8d 7a 78 be 01 00 00 [ 560.757967] RSP: 0018:ffa0000032e53d80 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 560.763848] RAX: ffa00000001dfd10 RBX: ffa0000000197090 RCX: ffa0000032e53db0 [ 560.771856] RDX: 5f080b54534f5f07 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ff11000128100010 [ 560.779867] RBP: ffa0000032e53df0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffffe77f08 [ 560.787879] R10: 0000000000ffff0a R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 560.795889] R13: ffa0000032e53e00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 560.803889] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff11007e7e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 560.812973] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 560.819422] CR2: 000055a04c118e68 CR3: 0000000007410005 CR4: 0000000000771ee0 [ 560.827433] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 560.835433] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 560.843444] PKRU: 55555554 [ 560.846480] Call Trace: [ 560.849225] [ 560.851580] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea [ 560.856488] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea [ 560.861379] ? amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 560.867778] ? show_regs.part.0+0x23/0x29 [ 560.872293] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd [ 560.876502] ? die_addr+0x3e/0x60 [ 560.880238] ? exc_general_protection+0x1c5/0x410 [ 560.885532] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30 [ 560.891025] ? amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu] [ 560.898323] amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 560.904520] process_one_work+0x228/0x3d0 How: In RAS recovery, mode-1 reset is issued from RAS fatal error handling and expected all the nodes in a hive to be reset. no need to issue another mode-1 during this procedure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-35931"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-19T11:15:49Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdgpu: Skip do PCI error slot reset during RAS recovery\n\nWhy:\n The PCI error slot reset maybe triggered after inject ue to UMC multi times, this\n caused system hang.\n [ 557.371857] amdgpu 0000:af:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset succeeded, trying to resume\n [ 557.373718] [drm] PCIE GART of 512M enabled.\n [ 557.373722] [drm] PTB located at 0x0000031FED700000\n [ 557.373788] [drm] VRAM is lost due to GPU reset!\n [ 557.373789] [drm] PSP is resuming...\n [ 557.547012] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_err_detected Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Exit, result = 3, need reset\n [ 557.547067] [drm] PCI error: detected callback, state(1)!!\n [ 557.547069] [drm] No support for XGMI hive yet...\n [ 557.548125] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Enter\n [ 557.607763] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: wait vital counter value 0x16b5b after 1 iterations\n [ 557.607777] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 1. Exit, err = 0, result = 5, recovered\n [ 557.610492] [drm] PCI error: slot reset callback!!\n ...\n [ 560.689382] amdgpu 0000:3f:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded!\n [ 560.689546] amdgpu 0000:5a:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded!\n [ 560.689562] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x5f080b54534f611f: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n [ 560.701008] CPU: 16 PID: 2361 Comm: kworker/u448:9 Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-91-generic #101-Ubuntu\n [ 560.712057] Hardware name: Microsoft C278A/C278A, BIOS C2789.5.BS.1C11.AG.1 11/08/2023\n [ 560.720959] Workqueue: amdgpu-reset-hive amdgpu_ras_do_recovery [amdgpu]\n [ 560.728887] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu]\n [ 560.736891] Code: ff 41 89 c6 e9 1b ff ff ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 4f ff ff ff be 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 76 c9 8b ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 3c fd ff ff \u003c48\u003e 83 ba 18 02 00 00 00 0f 84 6a f8 ff ff 48 8d 7a 78 be 01 00 00\n [ 560.757967] RSP: 0018:ffa0000032e53d80 EFLAGS: 00010202\n [ 560.763848] RAX: ffa00000001dfd10 RBX: ffa0000000197090 RCX: ffa0000032e53db0\n [ 560.771856] RDX: 5f080b54534f5f07 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ff11000128100010\n [ 560.779867] RBP: ffa0000032e53df0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffffe77f08\n [ 560.787879] R10: 0000000000ffff0a R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000\n [ 560.795889] R13: ffa0000032e53e00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000\n [ 560.803889] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff11007e7e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n [ 560.812973] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n [ 560.819422] CR2: 000055a04c118e68 CR3: 0000000007410005 CR4: 0000000000771ee0\n [ 560.827433] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n [ 560.835433] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n [ 560.843444] PKRU: 55555554\n [ 560.846480] Call Trace:\n [ 560.849225] \u003cTASK\u003e\n [ 560.851580] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea\n [ 560.856488] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea\n [ 560.861379] ? amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu]\n [ 560.867778] ? show_regs.part.0+0x23/0x29\n [ 560.872293] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd\n [ 560.876502] ? die_addr+0x3e/0x60\n [ 560.880238] ? exc_general_protection+0x1c5/0x410\n [ 560.885532] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30\n [ 560.891025] ? amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu]\n [ 560.898323] amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu]\n [ 560.904520] process_one_work+0x228/0x3d0\nHow:\n In RAS recovery, mode-1 reset is issued from RAS fatal error handling and expected\n all the nodes in a hive to be reset. no need to issue another mode-1 during this procedure.",
"id": "GHSA-5p3m-m55c-xwfg",
"modified": "2025-09-24T21:30:30Z",
"published": "2024-05-19T12:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35931"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/395ca1031acf89d8ecb26127c544a71688d96f35"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/601429cca96b4af3be44172c3b64e4228515dbe1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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