GHSA-5M64-3X43-VXJX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-07-08 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: iptfs: fix use-after-free on first_skb in __input_process_payload
__input_process_payload() stores first_skb into xtfs->ra_newskb under drop_lock when starting partial reassembly, then unlocks and breaks out of the processing loop. The post-loop check reads xtfs->ra_newskb without the lock to decide whether first_skb is still owned:
if (first_skb && first_iplen && !defer && first_skb != xtfs->ra_newskb)
Between spin_unlock and this read, a concurrent CPU running iptfs_reassem_cont() (or the drop_timer hrtimer) can complete reassembly, NULL xtfs->ra_newskb, and free the skb. The check then evaluates first_skb != NULL as true, and pskb_trim/ip_summed/consume_skb operate on the freed skb — a use-after-free in skbuff_head_cache.
Replace the unlocked read with a local bool that records whether first_skb was handed to the reassembly state in the current call. The flag is set after the existing spin_unlock, before the break, using the pointer equality that is stable at that point (first_skb == skb iff first_skb was stored in ra_newskb).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53240"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfrm: iptfs: fix use-after-free on first_skb in __input_process_payload\n\n__input_process_payload() stores first_skb into xtfs-\u003era_newskb under\ndrop_lock when starting partial reassembly, then unlocks and breaks out\nof the processing loop. The post-loop check reads xtfs-\u003era_newskb\nwithout the lock to decide whether first_skb is still owned:\n\n if (first_skb \u0026\u0026 first_iplen \u0026\u0026 !defer \u0026\u0026 first_skb != xtfs-\u003era_newskb)\n\nBetween spin_unlock and this read, a concurrent CPU running\niptfs_reassem_cont() (or the drop_timer hrtimer) can complete\nreassembly, NULL xtfs-\u003era_newskb, and free the skb. The check then\nevaluates first_skb != NULL as true, and pskb_trim/ip_summed/consume_skb\noperate on the freed skb \u2014 a use-after-free in skbuff_head_cache.\n\nReplace the unlocked read with a local bool that records whether\nfirst_skb was handed to the reassembly state in the current call. The\nflag is set after the existing spin_unlock, before the break, using the\npointer equality that is stable at that point (first_skb == skb iff\nfirst_skb was stored in ra_newskb).",
"id": "GHSA-5m64-3x43-vxjx",
"modified": "2026-07-08T15:31:47Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T09:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53240"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d9a79fbf5172d9c4c0146057af2360913265a11"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb48730bb827d1550401a5d391903f9d90b493c8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff2ee35b6ce5fa8a8e24ea50b15733d5c8780198"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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