GHSA-5FWR-5MG2-3P42
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
A corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when ext4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509
Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xd0/0x630 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70 iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
KASAN reports use-after-free because the out-of-bounds access lands in an adjacent freed page. The directory buffer itself is still referenced.
ext4_dir_llseek() invalidates the directory cookie so that ext4_readdir() rescans directory entries from the start of the block. The rescan checks only the lower bound of rec_len before advancing. A corrupted rec_len can therefore place the offset where the block has insufficient space for a complete directory entry. The rescan itself may dereference that truncated entry, or the main loop may pass it to __ext4_check_dir_entry(). The latter reads de->rec_len before validating the range. For example:
block offset 0 4092 4096 |---- de1.rec_len = 4092 -----|----| de2.inode | de2.rec_len ^ OOB, reported as UAF
de2 starts at offset 4092 in this 4 KiB block. Its four-byte inode fits in the block, but its rec_len starts at offset 4096 and crosses the boundary.
The minimum safe length is inode-dependent. Encrypted and casefolded directory entries need eight additional hash bytes, while a valid metadata checksum tail is only 12 bytes.
Cache the metadata checksum feature state and derive the minimum directory entry length from the on-disk format. Use it to bound both the rescan and the offset passed to the main loop. Report an offset in a truncated block tail and skip the remainder of the block, while continuing to accept an offset exactly at the block boundary.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-92499"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:52Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\next4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent\n\nA corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when\next4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position:\n\n BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820\n Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509\n\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70\n print_report+0xd0/0x630\n kasan_report+0xce/0x100\n __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820\n ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70\n iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520\n __x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220\n do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nKASAN reports use-after-free because the out-of-bounds access lands in an\nadjacent freed page. The directory buffer itself is still referenced.\n\next4_dir_llseek() invalidates the directory cookie so that ext4_readdir()\nrescans directory entries from the start of the block. The rescan checks\nonly the lower bound of rec_len before advancing. A corrupted rec_len can\ntherefore place the offset where the block has insufficient space for a\ncomplete directory entry. The rescan itself may dereference that truncated\nentry, or the main loop may pass it to __ext4_check_dir_entry(). The latter\nreads de-\u003erec_len before validating the range. For example:\n\n block offset 0 4092 4096\n |---- de1.rec_len = 4092 -----|----|\n de2.inode\n | de2.rec_len\n ^ OOB, reported as UAF\n\nde2 starts at offset 4092 in this 4 KiB block. Its four-byte inode fits in\nthe block, but its rec_len starts at offset 4096 and crosses the boundary.\n\nThe minimum safe length is inode-dependent. Encrypted and casefolded\ndirectory entries need eight additional hash bytes, while a valid metadata\nchecksum tail is only 12 bytes.\n\nCache the metadata checksum feature state and derive the minimum directory\nentry length from the on-disk format. Use it to bound both the rescan and\nthe offset passed to the main loop. Report an offset in a truncated block\ntail and skip the remainder of the block, while continuing to accept an\noffset exactly at the block boundary.",
"id": "GHSA-5fwr-5mg2-3p42",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:06Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92499"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/64d445d40e5ea4c4d4d88880db753b370cb69161"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4c728577933753180e3e97f08424d5bcaff705e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc4b7b0414c33b2c8898eb04386df0d21a13dad8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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