GHSA-5FV5-XJMM-VVX9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 12:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb-storage: ene_ub6250: fix race between scan work and probe
ene_ub6250_probe() calls usb_stor_probe2(), which starts the usb-storage infrastructure and schedules the delayed scan work. The driver then calls ene_get_card_type(), which sends an ENE command through ene_send_scsi_cmd() and the usb-storage bulk transfer helpers.
Both the delayed scan work, through usb_stor_Bulk_max_lun(), and ene_get_card_type() use us->current_urb. The scan work serializes this access with us->dev_mutex, but the ENE card-type probe does not. If the scan work runs while ene_get_card_type() is still using us->current_urb, usb_submit_urb() warns that the URB is already active.
Serialize ene_get_card_type() with us->dev_mutex, matching the locking used by the scan path.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90031"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:17:16Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb-storage: ene_ub6250: fix race between scan work and probe\n\nene_ub6250_probe() calls usb_stor_probe2(), which starts the usb-storage\ninfrastructure and schedules the delayed scan work. The driver then\ncalls ene_get_card_type(), which sends an ENE command through\nene_send_scsi_cmd() and the usb-storage bulk transfer helpers.\n\nBoth the delayed scan work, through usb_stor_Bulk_max_lun(), and\nene_get_card_type() use us-\u003ecurrent_urb. The scan work serializes this\naccess with us-\u003edev_mutex, but the ENE card-type probe does not. If the\nscan work runs while ene_get_card_type() is still using us-\u003ecurrent_urb,\nusb_submit_urb() warns that the URB is already active.\n\nSerialize ene_get_card_type() with us-\u003edev_mutex, matching the locking\nused by the scan path.",
"id": "GHSA-5fv5-xjmm-vvx9",
"modified": "2026-09-16T12:30:46Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90031"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c67f2ba9c5f7c5ab3670671c0d51c6504bcaf74"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/445fc368c6bc73eff0aeb3818cf5f355facfbb16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5082546702c32a2700894d2c0ace784e038ef6a3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8936d95dd04d34db96d4d1e3899eee52605bbedc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9481bc04a8c351ed883a7f0e10939bbe9120ead7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/996c319b8bd5ada1f62daae0d331d0b23e0f2117"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c261a83131e241d67cb73ab578d0265bc19cfb5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cd335f4f41e84d1ab88d80150ffee8dee9650d7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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